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1 INTRODUCTION 
Climate change challenges human rights (HRs) “as the dominant language of justice.”1 The 
embryonic HRs and climate change discourse has accepted this challenge. However, this 
discourse remains marginal – both in traditionally-technocratic international climate policy 
and debates around transitions to ‘green economies’ (the transition discourse). A green 
economy ‘guidebook’ for the 2012 Rio+20 Conference did not mention HRs.2  
This reflects HRs marginal status vis-à-vis the environment, development and 
economics generally. Suggesting these are HRs issues is a “frame change”3 from traditional 
approaches, raising questions of what understandings of HRs would assist such re-framing. 
Ultimately, it is questionable whether HRs are relevant in assisting transitions to low-carbon 
societies.   
Based on these discursive ‘gaps,’ this thesis seeks reconciliation of the HRs and 
climate change discourse with relevant strands of the transition discourse, especially ‘Just 
Transition’ (JT). There is no off-the-shelf tool for reconciling these evolving bodies of theory 
and practice; their different socioeconomic, political, legal and environmental facets require 
transdisciplinary approaches. Critical theory provides insights for this task.  
There is no single critical theory; as a “theoretical paradigm,”4 it recognises, as Cox 
said, “theory is always for someone, and… some purpose;” there is “no such thing as theory 
in itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space.”5 This “self-reflective” approach 
suggests “interpretations and theories do not simply describe reality but also shape… it.”6 
Critical theory distinguishes between “problem-solving” and “critical” theories. 
Problem-solving theory “takes the world” – its social relations and institutions – “as it finds 
it,” addressing issues within existing parameters. This positivism is not “value-free” as these 
parameters are themselves “value-bound;” thus, often unconsciously, we accept historical 
normative assumptions built into existing ideas and institutions. These normative assumptions 
appear “natural” and timeless given their hegemonic “commonsense status,” obscuring them 
from analysis. Issues effectively become problems (“sources of trouble”) for existing systems, 
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resolved using paradigmatic assumptions of particular disciplines aimed at making these 
systems “work smoothly.”7 
Contrastingly, critical theory “stands apart from the prevailing order,” asking “how 
that order came about.” Although starting in “particular sphere[s],” it seeks “construction of a 
larger picture” of historical processes. Crucially, “because it deals with a changing reality,” it 
“continually adjust[s]… to the changing object it seeks to understand,” rather than projecting 
itself as natural or timeless. Critical theory challenges “prevailing order by seeking out, 
analysing, and… assisting social processes” for “emancipatory change;” nonetheless, it seeks 
“possible alternatives” that “are feasible… in the existing world,” rejecting “improbable 
alternatives” through understanding historical processes in the interaction between social 
forces, ideas and institutions.
8
 Distinctions between hegemony and counter-hegemony assist 
this understanding; given critical theory recognises all theory is normative (explicitly or 
implicitly), it highlights counter-hegemonic discourses. This is why JT has been chosen for 
analysis, arising as it does from social movements and claiming to be a “bridge to the 
future.”9 The question is what role HRs can play in this bridge-building.  
HRs and critical theory have common Enlightenment roots. HRs were, originally, 
counter-hegemonic challenges to enclosed “political community.”10 However, critical theory 
acknowledges contradictions within ideas; even seemingly-critical theories can become 
problem-solving when fixed into “static,” “ahistorical” systems.11 Thus, HRs’ counter-
hegemonic nature co-exists with growing hegemonic uses. The same applies for ‘green 
economy’ and ‘JT.’ These, too, require critical appraisal. This involves an “immanent 
critique… to expose contradictions and tensions between ideas and practices” that provide 
opportunities for social change.
12
 Critical theory is therefore “both descriptive and 
constructive.”13 
Critical approaches also apply for ecology. They distinguish between natural and 
social facts; the “difference between Nature and History” is “human beings have created 
one... not the other;” “that which humans have the power to make, they have the power to 
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change.”14 Climate change – a natural fact created by humans – muddies this picture. Climate 
change is partly in our power to change; however, certain aspects are now, regardless of 
human agency, natural facts, limiting our responses. Meanwhile, those responses remain 
under our control. Consequently, it is vital, as Ytterstad suggests, to separate “political” and 
“natural realism”15 – recognising problem-solving approaches present certain paths as 
impossible, despite these being more consistent with scientific evidence. Thus, understandings 
of climate change are social constructions; critical approaches deconstruct these, working 
backwards from natural to political realism and highlighting the latter’s naturalising 
assumptions. Such approaches have only recently been applied to climate change. Cox 
suggests, given problem-solving and critical theories are “not mutually exclusive,” problem-
solving theory is “necessary” for climate change, suggesting “how to proceed given certain 
conditions” (for example, meeting energy needs). However, critical theory “broadens… 
inquiry” to “forces favoring or opposing changing patterns of behaviour” and recognises 
humans are “part of the biosphere,” challenging hegemonic thinking “that nature is… created 
in service of humans” and “a force to be dominated.”16  
Problem-solving approaches to HRs and climate change are necessary for assessing 
how climate change affects HRs, and how existing HRs systems address this. However, this 
does not provide a nexus for reconciliation with the transition discourse or JT. Firstly, given 
problem-solving approaches do not question frameworks within which they operate, they 
assume the continuation of basic tenets of the existing order, an order which causes climate 
change. Secondly, treating climate change as a ‘problem’ for HRs opens to its ‘resolution’ 
through ruling it out as a HRs issue altogether – or even using HRs as obstacles to progress. 
Critical re-evaluation is required to make HRs catalysts for the transition.  
Ultimately, the “frame change” of seeing HRs as issues for economic development and 
the environment is a critical reframing, expanding HRs beyond traditional boundaries. 
Examining its overlap with JT continues this expansion. This thesis therefore seeks to 
contribute to pushing HRs in a more critical direction. Reconciling critical elements of JT and 
HRs can give a framework for critically examining normative assumptions of climate policy 
in a particular context; an analytical tool for climate policy, and a basis of action towards 
alternatives realigning political realities with natural realism while securing HRs enjoyment. 
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Norway is the chosen context because it offers interesting contradictions – maintaining a 
high-profile in international climate politics, while also a major petroleum exporter. 
The main research question is therefore – what role can HRs play in a JT to a ‘green 
economy’ in Norway? This begets further questions addressed throughout, including: what 
understanding of HRs would be helpful in creating JT? Can HRs be catalysts for transitions? 
Can a HRs-based JT be both just and effective? Chapter Two, Just Transition to a Green 
Economy, examines the transition discourse and JT. Chapter Three, Human Rights and the 
Transition, charts the HRs and climate change discourse, examining critical approaches 
relevant to JT and how these approaches and JT might be reconciled. In Chapter Four, this 
reconciled approach is applied to Norway.  
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2 JUST TRANSITION TO A GREEN ECONOMY 
2.1 The transition discourse 
The term ‘green economy’ is “fiercely contested”17 and “confusing even for seasoned 
professionals.”18 While the contemporary transition discourse has roots in earlier 
environmental theories, it must be distinguished from ‘green economics,’ a body of theory 
associated with environmental movements. Gaining prominence in the late 2000s, ‘green 
economy’ has become a theme for responses to “multiple global crises,” especially climate 
and financial crises.
19
 ‘Transition’ and ‘green economy’ signify “a more… holistic approach 
to incorporating environment and development in economic… policy.”20 Thus, this transition 
discourse’s emergence partly reacts to hegemonic environmental economic approaches 
labelled “ecoliberalism,” which stress “ecological modernization,” market-driven “techno-
managerial innovations” and cost-benefit approaches within existing economic systems.21 
Ecoliberalism itself has received renewed momentum given post-financial crisis fiscal 
austerity, including the British government’s ‘green economy’ initiatives.22  
 Responses to ecoliberalism can be divided into two rough categories – ‘Green New 
Dealism’ (GND) and ‘environmental justice.’ GND, represented by the UN Environmental 
Programme’s Green Economy Initiative (UNEPGEI), seeks a larger state role in the 
transition, effectively envisioning returns to “Fordist” industrial relations with social dialogue 
and domestic industrial strategies;
23
 the transition thus renegotiates the neoliberal settlement, 
but does not reject existing economic paradigms, including economic growth. While UNEP’s 
“green economy” definition is “becoming hegemonic,” this is contested by EJ proponents 
(particularly those frustrated by the Rio+20 conference)
24
 who argue GND, especially 
UNEPGEI, reduces ecology to part of economics, ignoring that one cannot have economies 
without ecology. Pricing “ecological services” is considered methodologically dubious given 
their necessity to survival, and wrongly assumes “substitutability” of ecosystems through 
trading. Furthermore, by integrating ecology into markets, it removes participatory influences 
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on environmental decision-making and provides opportunities to hegemonic actors, 
effectively perpetuating and reinvigorating neo-liberalism by failing to address imbalances 
between market and state.
25
 EJ, and similarly climate justice, thus questions fundamental 
tenets of capitalist accumulation causing mutually-reinforcing social and environmental 
injustices,
26
 seeking state interventionism combined with grassroots social movement 
pressure.  
GND and EJ share talk of a “green industrial revolution,”27 questioning markets’ 
ability (at least alone) to deliver rapid or fair transitions based on growing awareness that 
impacts will be geographically “uneven.”28 The discourse therefore focuses greatly on 
employment and ‘green jobs.’ This has gathered evidence that, far from being a “job-killer,”29 
renewables are more labour-intensive “per megawatt of power installed, per unit of energy 
produced, and per [unit] of investment” than fossil fuels, with energy efficiency-related jobs 
even more so.
30
 This is partly because green investments involve greater domestic 
infrastructural investment and local sourcing, and generate more jobs at all pay levels, 
including lower-paid, “entry-level” jobs.31 Energy efficiency can also create further jobs 
through energy savings.
32
 Studies of mitigation or green economy strategies in Europe,
33
 
North America,
34
 Australia, and large ‘developing’ states35 all predict net employment gains 
in scenarios with fossil fuel jobs losses.   
However, labour mobility and skills shortages might, short-term, cause structural 
unemployment;
36
 these are often overlooked by input-output models in green jobs studies, 
which have fixed relationships between sector outputs, and assume no labour or resource 
constraints.
37
 Achieving potential green jobs therefore requires skills strategies. Studies 
critical of input-output models still find renewables produce more jobs in manufacturing, 
construction, operation and maintenance, and fuel production and processing than fossil 
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fuels.
38
 Analytical computer modelling also predicts net gains. Fundamentally, such 
predictions depend on the strategies modelled; OECD modelling finds only modest net gains 
when carbon pricing revenues reduce labour taxation,
39
 although their estimates cover isolated 
policies (emissions trading) rather than comprehensive programmes outlined by others. 
Indeed, most ‘baseline’ scenarios simply project current trends forward, rather than 
comparing green jobs scenarios to deleterious effects from climate change
40
 or fossil fuel 
depletion. 
Thus, this debate, originally attempting to overcome the false, essentialist ‘jobs versus 
environment’ dichotomy, has itself become essentialising, implying certain technologies or 
policies naturally produce net job gains. More critically, net gains can result from green job 
programmes, but this depends on their parameters; any “positive net effect, and the duration 
and pain of the transition, are materially affected by the extent of comprehensive planning.”41 
As Lee and Card conclude, “estimates should be considered potential jobs… realized only 
through… [a] “just transition.””42 
 
2.2 Just Transition 
There is no fixed definition of JT, which makes charting its historical development 
imperative. It emerged among North America trade unionists responding to nascent 1970s 
environmental policy, including timber job losses during Redwood National Park expansion.
43
 
It remerged in revitalised labour-environmentalist alliances around 1990s anti-globalisation 
campaigns.
44
 JT has subsequently been adopted by trade unions and governments 
internationally alongside the rise of the transition discourse. In the 2010 Cancun Agreements, 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) parties recognised “ensuring a 
just transition of the workforce that creates decent work and quality jobs” within “a paradigm 
shift towards… a low-carbon society” that “ensures continued high growth and sustainable 
development, based on innovative technologies and more sustainable production and 
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consumption.”45 Thus, JT is an idea within the transition discourse, varying from deployment 
as a slogan to comprehensive transformative visions.  
I offer the following thin definition, which JT’s different strands share: JT is a 
normative marker of workers and communities embracing a transition from environmentally-
harmful to sustainable production provided their interests are protected.  
JT is a normative marker because its defines itself as much by what it opposes as what 
it proposes, drawing on perceptions (backed empirically)
46
 that past environmentally-induced 
(and general) industrial transformations have been unjust, and that fear of “creative 
destruction,” inherent to ecological modernisation, is an “obstacle to structural change.”47 
Therefore, “few workers” will support transitions “if they fear they will lose their 
livelihood.”48 JT thus stresses transition planning, rather than reliance on market forces. 
Embracing the transition recasts workers and communities as participants, rather than 
“victims.”49 This shifts “the debate from… how to save certain jobs to how to save certain 
workers… resituat[ing] environmental problems in human terms” and avoiding “ecocentric 
arguments… many workers find inaccessible.”50  
Transitioning from environmentally-harmful to sustainable production provided 
workers’ and communities’ interests are protected envisages a “green social contract,” 
guaranteeing “no-one will be left behind” as “a prerequisite for change.”51 JT has expanded 
from “reactive” roots (focussed on particular job losses) to more “proactive” perspectives 
(focussed on general job creation).
52
 It is concerned with jobs’ quality and quantity; as 
industrialised countries’ carbon-intensive jobs are often well-paid and unionised,53 JT seeks to 
transfer this job security to green economies, recognising green jobs are not automatically 
decent.
54
 JT thus usually envisages workers’ protection schemes in carbon-intensive industries 
alongside green jobs programmes. Protection programmes commonly include targeted 
retraining; income support during transitions to new jobs; “top-up” income for a period if 
workers receive a lower paid job (as “wage insurance” incentivising returns to work); and 
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relocation assistance.
55
 Suggested funding includes phasing-out carbon-intensive subsidies,
56
 
pollution taxes,
57
 and redistributive taxation.
58
  
Beyond these commonalities, there is significant interpretative divergence over JT’s 
different aspects, partly given its dialectical evolution between more reformist strands (now 
associated with GND) and EJ traditions. Therefore, “minimalist” interpretations, emphasising 
“reformist change… green jobs, social protection, retraining and consultation” for vulnerable 
workers, exist alongside “transformative” visions of “new ways of producing and 
consuming.”59 Thus, while the Cancun Agreements place JT alongside economic growth, 
others suggest “the crisis we face today largely exists” given growth has been used “to 
measure success.”60 
Varying labour movement traditions can spur such divergences. JT’s roots in Anglo-
Saxon economies, where tripartite cooperation between unions, employers and governments 
is (at best) underdeveloped, and EJ narratives originated, have begotten a distinct JT strand 
focused on labour-environmental alliances through “social movement unionism”61 and class 
struggle. Workers’ protections during Redwood National Park expansion, inspiring the first 
JT proclamations, were won through labour-environmentalist campaigning.
62
 Proponents of 
this strand often cite the “Lucas Plan” in 1970s Britain among archetypal JT struggles.63 
Workers at arms producers Lucas Aerospace answered proposed job cuts with a programme 
for transitioning from weapons production to solar cells, wind turbines,
64
 and electric cars. 
Blue and white-collar unions cooperated; however, employers and government met them with 
hostility.
65
 Lacking coordinated protest strategies, the unions were defeated. This episode 
nonetheless inspired similar transition plans at Chrysler,
66
 and new formal American labour-
environmentalist alliances.
67
 It is often invoked to illustrate social dialogue’s limits and the 
need for social movement strategies. Another example used to illustrate this is the ‘Green 
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Bans’ movement in 1970s Australia, when workers in environmentally-damaging 
construction developments, allied with local conservationists, refused to work and joined 
direct action, saving numerous green spaces.
68
  
Simultaneously, JT’s export to European welfare capitalist countries, with traditions of 
tripartite cooperation, has seen another strand emerge focussed on social dialogue, seeing JT 
itself as a means to strengthen tripartite cooperation (as in the European Trade Union 
Congress’s JT principles).69 Social dialogue played a role when Navarre, Spain, launched an 
active programme, including skills initiatives between social partners and local universities, to 
replace its declining car industry with wind energy. Navarre is now a leader within European 
wind, maintaining Spain’s lowest unemployment levels during the financial crisis while 
increasing renewable energy production from 0 to 65 percent in 15 years.
70
 This strand 
appreciates labour-environmentalist collaboration to a lesser extent, but can incorporate 
environmentalists alongside social partners. In Germany, the “Alliance for Employment and 
the Environment,” created by the Confederation of German Trade Unions and now a 
partnership with employers, government and environmental groups, regularly exceeds targets 
to retrofit 300,000 homes and create 200,000 jobs annually, renovating 2.4 million residences 
over 10 years and reducing emissions by 1.5 megatonnes (Mt) CO2 in 2009 alone.
71
 JT is thus 
used to bridge perceived irreconcilability between unions and community groups, which 
sometimes prioritise short-term social issues despite “longer-term interests (whether 
recognised or not)” vis-à-vis climate change and resource scarcity, and environmentalists, 
who sometimes neglect social justice.
72
 JT proponents, particularly from EJ strands, stress 
what can be “learned from each other”73 through cross-fertilisation between labour and 
environmentalist principles.  
From critical perspectives, focus on social dialogue can overlook power relations 
behind dialogue. Dialogue mostly succeeds on small-scales where capital, labour and state 
interests are aligned (as in Navarre) or where there are dialogue traditions. To succeed more 
generally, prior mobilisation is necessary to strengthen labour’s relative negotiating position. 
Where this has not happened, social dialogue is ineffective; Spanish sector roundtables on the 
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Kyoto Protocol (KP) were criticised by unions after other social partners’ commitment waned 
during the financial crisis.
74
 Thus, focussing on social dialogue without addressing power 
relations encourages a problem-solving tendency within JT that serves union leaderships’ and 
industries’ interests through giving the appearance of incorporating climate concerns without 
significantly changing course. Indeed, while many unions have embraced environmental 
concern, “close political network[s]” between employers, industry ministries and unions in 
carbon-intensive sectors
75
 have often been “the single largest barrier” to transitions.76 
Problem-solving versions of JT do not sufficiently address how concerned workers in such 
industries might otherwise participate, effectively assuming unions always represent 
members’ (long-term) interests.  
 Furthermore, focus on the process of social dialogue does not necessarily outline 
parameters for outcomes, effectively postponing consideration of what JT is to achieve. Thus, 
JT can simply give the appearance of embracing transitions while the “content of that 
commitment is unclear;”77 some visions therefore promote little more than “a compensation 
culture”78 that does not achieve climate or social goals, with social partners self-defining 
dialogue parameters to serve parochial interests. This makes JT a formalistic exercise that 
does not challenge hegemonic approaches; indeed, recognition in the Cancun Agreements 
exemplifies formal commitments with few, if any, concrete consequences. 
 This relates to contradictions between minimalist and transformative JT visions. 
Fundamentally, one can ask why those losing jobs because of climate initiatives should 
receive special protections unavailable to other laid-off workers – a question of whether JT 
defends parochial interests or envisages “universal rights.”79 Thus, regarding interests to be 
protected, there is also a divide between narrower visions focussed on existing economic 
interests, and broader transformations to deepen workers’ and communities’ rights and extend 
rights to traditionally-disadvantaged groups. EJ proponents criticise more defensive strands 
for reproducing Northern “postwar class compromise[s]… between organized labor, the state, 
and capital” that, through protecting existing entitlements, “further marginalize… women, 
racialized communities… and the Majority World.” GND, in “strengthening the political 
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power of [Northern] unions” as institutions, “could foster… militant particularism” instead of 
“global environmental justice.”80 
This is relevant regarding ‘carbon leakage,’ which occurs when climate policy in one 
(usually ‘developed’) country causes carbon-intensive industries to relocate to another 
(usually ‘developing’) state with lower environmental standards, increasing global emissions 
and causing job losses in ‘developed’ states.81 Several actors, including Norwegian JT 
supporters, argue against unilateral climate action given leakage, effectively placing 
multilateral agreements before JTs.
82
 Empirical studies suggest leakage has been minimal for 
several climate policies,
83 and is “highly unlikely” to invalidate completely national emission 
reductions.
84
 Furthermore, the OECD suggests environmental policies’ effects “pale in 
comparison” to economic factors in industrial relocation.85 Thus, carbon leakage occurs due 
to competitiveness drivers, not climate policy. Nonetheless, given affected industries are 
“politically powerful,” climate policy often includes compensatory measures,86 hampering 
policy effectiveness
87
 and effectively postponing transitions. As Tømte notes, unions fixated 
on carbon leakage’s job-related effects would not drop demands for good wages and working 
conditions, which more directly trigger relocation; clinging to carbon leakage suggests some 
unions would rather “go to the bottom” with carbon-intensive industries than be part of 
solutions.
88
 This again suggests problem-solving JT approaches can delay climate action.  
More critical, EJ accounts cite capitalist accumulation and overconsumption as 
increasing emissions,
89
 regard economic democratisation as “central” to JT given “limited 
resources will mean determining who has access to these resources,”90 and stress 
internationalist linkages to create “enabling environment[s]” for transitions.91 Thus, 
transitions from fossil fuel exports implicate fossil fuel dependency elsewhere.
92
 This is 
recognised by “Transition Towns,” which build local resilience against fossil fuel dependence 
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following cross-national templates.
93
 Here, environmentalist principles, like localisation, 
clearly influence JT and social movements use “prefigurative politics,”94 a form of being the 
change one wants to achieve.    
 This table summarises JT’s common features and emphases of different strands: 
 
ASPECT COMMONALITIES GND EJ 
Main proponents  Unions; 
Environmentalists; 
Community groups.  
Welfare capitalist 
states; 
Industries with 
social dialogue 
tradition. 
Anglo-Saxon 
economies; 
Industries without 
social dialogue 
tradition. 
A normative marker… Reaction to past transitions; 
Planning, not market forces. 
…Workers and 
communities 
embrace… 
Participation; 
Labour-
environmentalist 
alliances. 
Social dialogue. Social movement 
unionism; 
Environmentalist 
principles. 
… Transition from 
environmentally-
harmful to sustainable 
production provided 
interests are protected. 
Workers’ protection 
and green jobs; 
State interventionism. 
Reformism; 
Primarily economic 
interests; 
Green growth. 
Social transformation; 
Economic 
democratisation; 
Internationalism. 
 
These aspects, particularly JT’s contradictions, are relevant when addressing the role of HRs 
in JT.  
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3 HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE TRANSITION  
This chapter examines the emerging climate change and HRs discourse and the possible roles 
for HRs in JT.  
 
3.1 HRs and climate change  
The climate change and HRs discourse outlines how climate change affects HRs directly and 
indirectly (through responses to climate change).
95
 Fundamentally, climate change challenges 
HRs “as the dominant language of justice;”96 thus, HRs reframe climate change in justice 
terms. Humphreys’s main climate justice issues are:97 
 
 Corrective justice – those responsible for climate change “cause injuries” to a 
“different (much larger) group,” who are also the most vulnerable;  
 Substantive justice – mitigation could reduce development potential for those that have 
not undertaken carbon-intensive development, exacerbating inequality; 
 Procedural justice – this concerns participation and distributive justice; and 
 Formal justice – strict legal approaches suggest historical polluters, unaware of 
climate change, cannot be denied their built-up wealth, and might be compensated 
during any transition. This usually involves property rights,
98
 but is arguably relevant 
to workers’ protection.  
 
HRs responses to these can be divided between problem-solving and critical approaches, 
legalistic and structural approaches, or (in Galtung’s critical HRs theory) “actor-orientated” 
and “structure-orientated” approaches.99 Predominance of legalistic approaches has restricted 
HRs’ role within the transition discourse and encouraged viewing HRs as obstacles, rather 
than catalysts, for transitions.  
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3.2 Legalistic approaches 
Legalistic perspectives dominate HRs systems. These have been applied to climate change, 
including the ‘Inuit petition’ to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, in which Inuit 
communities alleged US action and inaction caused numerous HR violations. The petition 
failed to satisfy eligibility criteria or allow judges (in their view) “to determine whether the 
alleged facts… characterize[d] a violation.”100 UN Human Rights Council resolutions since 
2008, and an Office of the High Commissioner’s (OHCHRs) report on climate change, have 
also influenced legal approaches.
101
  
 Several factors restrict legalistic approaches from impacting on climate politics or the 
transition discourse.    
 
3.2.1 Attribution 
Humphreys suggests HRs most clearly implicated by climate change are also the most 
difficult to enforce under international law, namely economic, social and cultural rights 
(ESCRs).
102
 ESCRs have occupied secondary status within the HRs system as some states and 
actors regard them as “aspirational,” not “justiciable.”103 The main HRs treaties – the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – were originally intended as one 
document, but were split under Cold War-related disagreements over ESCRs’ “practical 
difficulties.”104 ICCPR has long been equipped with a committee to hear individual 
complaints, developing an international jurisprudence alongside CPRs’ historical domestic 
jurisprudence (given these were the ‘first generation’ of HRs emerging in modern states). 
However, ICESCR’s individual complaints mechanism will only enter into force in 2013.105 
This jurisprudential mismatch reinforces views that ESCRs are non-justiciable, despite 
evolving enforcement nationally.
106
 This restricts HRs’ application to economic issues. Where 
ESCRs have been recognised, actor-orientated approaches encourage a view that basic needs 
must be “provided by “somebody”… here and now,” rather than reforming structures to 
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secure sustainable access.
107
 Even where CPRs are implicated by climate change, attributing 
violations to discrete actors is difficult;
108
 OHCHR suggests it is “virtually impossible to 
disentangle… complex causal relationships” linking emitters to specific events, or 
contributions of anthropogenic versus natural emissions.
109
 Regardless, HRs enforcement 
mechanisms, globally and nationally, are considered weak.
110
  
Litigation has proved frustrating, despite increasing recognition of state’s duties to 
protect against third party violations; improving scientific foundations for attribution;
111
 and 
creative uses of legal principles, including joint and several liability, alongside climate-related 
norms like ‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’112 Legal strategies have focussed on 
the few clear direct violations thus far; tackling climate change’s core economic drivers has 
been difficult, and it remains unclear how indirect threats can be addressed litigiously. 
Ultimately, legal professionals, particularly judges, seem reluctant to treat climate change as a 
legal issue.  
 
3.2.2 Reactive rights 
Even when courts hear climate-related cases, they are usually only in a position to grant relief 
after violations. For Humphreys, HRs professionals “are unlikely, as a matter of professional 
orientation” to take up “hypothetical” issues; “future harms simply escape [HRs’] ordinary 
purview.” HRs references within climate politics are thus “almost exclusively” related to 
“harms that have already taken place.”113 Legal approaches involve some “forward thinking” 
as “judicial systems are… deterrence mechanisms;”114 however, climate-related deterrence 
effects are limited. Financial remedies are usually insufficient to deter corporations or 
governments,
115
 while litigation’s public relations consequences are not always effective, 
especially when those targeted do not have direct public relationships.
116
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3.2.3 Statecentricism  
Sovereignty is “the biggest impediment” to tackling climate change117 but also the bedrock of 
the HRs system. States, as primary HRs duty-bearers, have three HRs obligations – respect 
(refraining for harm), protect (measures against harm by third parties) and fulfil (initiatives to 
promote enjoyment of HRs) duties. Vis-à-vis climate change, respect duties correspond to 
mitigation; protection involves regulating third-parties, as well as adaption; and fulfil 
obligations encompass all measures for fully realising HRs, including international 
assistance.
118
 However, given states most affected by climate change are also those with least 
responsibility or capacity to respond, victims find obtaining relief difficult through national or 
international structures.
119
 Deriving extraterritorial HRs duties (owed to people outside of a 
state’s territory) – from ICESCR Article 2’s reference to “international assistance and co-
operation,” or given many affected HRs are erga omnes obligations120 or jus cogens – has 
faltered given states’ unwillingness to concede such obligations. Courts have set high bars for 
extraterritorial HRs application (including the European system and American Alien Tort 
statues).
121
 As Humphreys highlights, states are traditionally reluctant to challenge each other 
using interstate complaints mechanisms, even after Chernobyl. Meanwhile, powerful private 
actors, particularly corporations, can escape liability through using forum non conveniens and 
parent-subsidiary structuring, swiftly moving operations between countries, and extracting 
favourable conditions from states.
122
 Sovereignty remains an “unresolved contradiction” for 
HRs
123
 given states’ violator-protector duality.  
 
3.2.4 Formal justice 
HR can also be direct obstacles to climate policy through legal formalism. Adelman notes 
how HRs’ can suffer “depoliticisation,” becoming “ends in themselves,” not “means 
towards… substantive justice.”124 Broader justice issues behind positive law, and their 
relevance to climate-related justice debates, are thus overlooked, perpetuated by legal 
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positivism’s artificial separation between politics and law. Examples include how once 
“subaltern” rights to sovereignty over natural resources and development have been misused 
to justify conceiving of carbon reserves as “sovereign property,” rather than commons.125 
Humphreys laments that “international law can… endorse claims based on historical 
entitlements, yet deny claims for rectification of historical wrongs.”126   
Furthermore, formalistic argumentation can exclude HRs from climate policy 
altogether – defining climate change as an “emergency” could allow use of derogation clauses 
in HRs treaties to suspend certain HRs, echoing arguments that HRs are a “brake on… the 
greater good” of avoiding climate catastrophe.127 Some HRs “traditionalists” may also “seek 
limits on climate action” given it “empower[s] government” over individuals.128 
 
3.2.5 Uses of law 
Legal approaches are most fruitful where individual judgments draw broader structural 
conclusions. Examples include actio popularis and the European Court of Human Rights Pilot 
Judgement Procedure, applying individual rulings to similar cases in instances of systematic 
abuses. However, these approaches are limited. Practically, litigation is inaccessible for the 
most vulnerable given time and resources.
129
 Fundamentally, governments enjoy significant 
scope to circumvent judgments given undeveloped consensus around climate-related HR 
rules. As Humphreys suggests, states claim they fulfil HRs obligations simply by participating 
in climate negotiations aimed at clarifying such rules.
130
 Consensus around climate-related 
HRs norms has to be built before legal applications become possible. Focusing on lex lata 
(law as it is) thus neglects not only lex ferenda (law as it should be), but also how law is made 
and who makes it. For example, British climate legislation, applied in various legal 
judgments, resulted from political processes and social movement mobilisation; its continued 
development is defined by political and legal interpretations.
131
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There is a tendency towards legal traditionalism, a “legal reflex,”132 both within HRs 
discourses and external perceptions of HRs, which has become hegemonic. Pogge suggests 
this fixation with “juridification” is both “too strong” (given HRs can be secured without 
legislation) and “too weak” (as legalisation does not guarantee access), while militating 
against culturally-diverse approaches.
133
 Humphreys therefore concludes that the HRs 
system’s weaknesses “appear exacerbated” by climate change134 and it is unclear whether 
“recourse to human rights law or principles” answers climate justice claims.135 Galtung 
suggests “only a fraction of” HRs-related issues “can be adequately conceived of… within an 
actor-orientated discourse,” which obscures “social evils.”136  
Ultimately, legal approaches’ individualism, through violator-violated binaries, is 
unsuited to climate change. Problem-solving HRs approaches to climate change have focused 
on climate change effects, rather than causes. By overlooking structural factors, they do not 
challenge social forces or institutions that uphold carbon-intensive economic systems, 
meaning they fail to address corrective or substantive justice; while they have potential for 
procedural justice, greater recognition is currently available in international law for formal 
justice claims. Given problem-solving approaches aim to make systems work smoothly, the 
HRs system’s response to climate ‘problems’ has effectively been to avoid facing its justice 
implications, or to employ HRs as ‘brakes’ to avoid disruption.  
 
3.3 Structural approaches  
More critical, structural HRs approaches are often inspired by Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) Article 28 (“everyone is entitled to a social and international order in 
which the rights and freedoms… in this Declaration can be fully realized”).137 Structural 
approaches go beyond law, considering HRs, in Beitz’s words, as a “global practice… both 
discursive and political” within “a global discursive community” that “recognize[s] the 
practice’s norms as reasoning-giving… in deliberating and arguing about how to act;” thus, 
HRs are “reason-giving for various kinds of political action” and actors.138 For Gready and 
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Ensor, this recognises HRs as “rights as the everyday” – they are, simultaneously, rules, 
structures, institutions, relationships and processes. Conceptualising rights within socio-
political processes recognises their “generative” status, constantly constructed and re-
constructed through struggle. This “social change function” acknowledges, in a globalised 
world, HRs continuously require new duties and duty-bearers, overcoming static 
statecentricism.
139
 As Adelman suggests, HRs “are a contradictory mixture of transcendence – 
universal, inherent and inalienable – and… immanence in struggle and resistance.”140 
Structural approaches therefore emphasise HRs’ collective dimension – both their collective 
exercising, and collective duties shared across actors.  
 Relevant structural approaches, and their climate-related applications, are explored 
here.  
 
3.3.1 Analytical frameworks 
One category of structural approaches provides analytical frameworks for reinterpreting HRs 
vis-à-vis changing structural processes, including ecology. These therefore address 
Humphrey’s corrective and substantive justice issues.  
One such approach is ‘solidarity rights’ – a postulated ‘third generation’ of HRs 
seeking to “overcome the solitary autonomy” of traditional CPRs and ESCRs.141 They 
reformulate HRs’ fulfilment around new “threats” from “global interdependence” that are 
threats in themselves and to other HRs, implying HRs originally did not provide a coherent 
normative framework for their joint implementation in an interdependent world. They are 
termed ‘enabling,’ or ‘meta-rights,’ because they seek fulfilment of all HRs under one 
umbrella right.
142
  
Some argue solidarity rights (chiefly rights to development, peace and a healthy 
environment) can be derived from existing HRs;
143
 alternatively, solidarity rights offer a 
fundamentally different approach by reframing HRs around global issues, and redefining 
them as fundamentally about HRs. This shifts the unit of analysis for development, peace or 
the environment from states to individuals, where HRs are minimal guarantees protecting 
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human dignity against these larger forces. Thus, solidarity rights reclaim global issues as 
individual rights, ensuring individuals have access regardless of states’ disposition;144 and, 
simultaneously, reframe HRs as exercised collectively.  
Adelman describes climate change as “the sticking point at which repeated post-
colonial demands for a fairer international order,” including the right to development, “must 
finally… be met.”145 Adelman proposes a climate-related “meta-right.”146 Such meta-rights 
(like ‘Greenhouse Development Rights’) are often expressed as an equal right to emit, 
distinguishing between “luxury” and “subsistence emissions,” the latter of which are 
necessary to HRs.
147
 However, these effectively presume subsistence and emissions are 
inextricably linked beyond the current economic paradigm. As Hayward stresses, “it is the 
benefits [of emissions], not the emissions” that matter.148 Hayward instead proposes a right to 
“ecological space,” recognising the ecological crisis’s entirety, and that clearer links exist 
between all natural resources and human survival. Thus, legitimate substantive justice claims 
for development “are not assumed... to translate into emissions entitlements” that further 
exacerbate climate change. Rather, those who exceed their ecological space must realign with 
ecological limits but also accrue “ecological debt,” obliging reparations to those affected 
through wealth and technology transfer.
149
 This effectively defines sustainable development 
and a ‘green economy’ as enjoying HRs within an amount of ecological space that, if 
generalised, could be enjoyed by everyone without affecting future generations’ rights, thus 
realigning HRs with natural realism. This suggests HRs cannot be neutral on fundamental 
economic questions, such as economic growth. “Immaterial” growth is empirically dubious; 
even service industries require enormous (physical) resources.
150
 The “dilemma of the N-
curve” also shows how ecological efficiency gains are often eclipsed by subsequent growth.151 
Crucially, after certain levels of material wealth, many social indicators (HRs proxies) have 
no correlation with wealth.
152
 Growth for growth’s sake is incompatible with ecologically-
limited rights; HRs enjoyment should measure progress.  
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Another structural approach is cosmopolitanism, especially Pogge’s “institutional” 
theory, which goes beyond domestic theories of justice, acknowledging interactions between 
institutions across borders.
153
 This sees HRs as “primarily... claims on coercive social 
institutions and secondarily... claims against those who uphold such institutions.”154 Since 
HRs are moral claims on societal organisation, societies “ought to be so (re)organized that all 
its members have secure access” to HRs.155 “Members” include those in other societies, given 
societies affect one another, and future participants (also affected by present 
considerations).
156
 “Negative” duties (duties not to subject others to particular actions) are 
therefore paramount – everyone has a negative duty “not to cooperate in upholding” a 
coercive order unless they compensate “by protecting its victims or… working for its reform.” 
Before directly supplying HRs, we should first ensure any coercive social order we 
“collectively impose upon” ourselves “is one under which, insofar as reasonably possible, 
each has secure access to these necessities.”157  
Pogge’s use of the negative-positive dichotomy is unfortunate; the ‘negative’ duties he 
envisions require significant ‘positive’ action, making the distinction analytically-dubious. 
Nevertheless, Humphreys suggests Pogge’s ideas are relevant for climate change; negative 
duties recommend “urgent and stringent mitigation,” while institutional focuses recognise we 
should question international law’s existing inadequate “architecture” vis-à-vis climate 
change.
158
 The key coercive institution vis-à-vis climate change is carbon-intensive 
development itself, and various structures and actors upholding it. Vitally, Pogge recognises 
HRs can be enjoyed short-term without long-term access being secure
159
 – thus, HRs in 
carbon-intensive societies are insecure from climate effects and depletion of non-renewable 
resources on which they depend.  
Pogge parallels Shue’s definition of HRs as “rationally justified demand[s] for social 
guarantees against standard threats” guaranteed “only when arrangements have been made… 
to enjoy” them, necessitating a universal duty “to make and keep effective arrangements.”160 
This recognises HRs’ “dynamic character” – changing threats require new arrangements. Bell 
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develops this into an overarching climate-related HRs obligation to promote effective 
institutions for protecting basic HRs against climate threats; climate change violates HRs 
given “our collective failure to fulfil” this. This obligation implies a “general duty” to 
“promote and maintain effective institutions that… ‘specify and allocate’ the more specific 
duties needed to” protect basic HRs on the basis of justice principles. However, to avoid 
allowing actors to argue they fulfil this simply through negotiation, the general duty also 
implies a “duty of rectification” where “previous non-compliers… accept more burdensome 
duties” than “if they had always complied with the general duty;” and a duty “not to accept 
benefits... from the failure of other[s]… to comply with the general duty,” for example 
through halting progress in negotiations. Thus, previous non-compliers must begin reducing 
emissions immediately and abide by emissions targets when the general duty is fulfilled.
161
 
Existing HRs thus insist on climate action independent of climate agreements; the USA may 
reject the KP for lacking targets for ‘developing’ states, but remains accountable “irrespective 
of the action or inaction of any other nation.”162  
 
3.3.2 Policy principles 
Other structural HRs approaches address evaluating and planning climate policy. HRs-based 
approaches to development (HRBAs) increasingly tackle climate change. Humphreys argues 
climate change places HRs “firmly within the context of development.”163 While HRBAs 
were produced for ‘developing’ states, its principles apply for economic development 
generally.  
HRBAs reframe achieving HRs “as an objective of development.” They share 
critiques of existing developmental models, envisaging moving “away from a… service-
driven, to a more strategic approach”164 in response to needs-based approaches and neo-
liberalism;
165
 explicit use of HRs standards to guide development outcomes;
166
 and explicit 
use of HRs principles to guide development processes.
167
 These therefore implicate all of 
Humphrey’s justice claims.  
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HRBAs are increasingly used to “put a human face on climate change,”168 with rights 
“language” helping “explain climate injustice.”169 Key aspects of this are examined below. 
 
3.3.2.1 Normative standards 
HRBAs aim to give development, an abstract term simply expressing “a normative conception 
of desired change,” a “substantive coherence” and “legal and normative foundation in 
international law with broad-based international support.”170 This “explicit normative 
framework” emphasises “mutually-reinforcing deprivations” constituting poverty and 
underdevelopment
171
 based on the ‘Capabilities Approach’ outlined by Sen. HRBAs thus seek 
not only quantitative outcomes but “a political transformation,” challenging existing power 
relations.
172
 First steps in HRBAs are analysing inequality in a given context, before 
identifying relevant international HRs standards.
173
  
When applied to climate policy, as Caney notes, HRs “specify minimum moral 
thresholds” that cannot be breached, either directly or indirectly through responses. 
Thresholds “override all other moral values,” including aggregate welfare,174 thus rejecting 
consequentialism’s countenance of partial suffering to avoid higher costs for the majority, 
while recognising intergenerational equity.
175
 Thresholds provide normative standards for 
defining “dangerous anthropogenic interference” under the UNFCCC, namely interference 
that “systematically undermines… widespread” HRs enjoyment.176 Consequently, “there is a 
maximum permissible level of emissions.”177 This challenges the oft-cited two degree 
Celsisus (°C) target. Indeed, the 2°C target originated with an economist in the 1970s, a 
“marginal remark” resurrected in the 1990s “as a possibility to delimit a domain of safety.”178 
After adoption by the EU,
179
 it has influenced further target-setting, gaining acceptance in the 
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2009 Copenhagen Accords.
180
 Hansen describes 2°C as “a prescription for disaster.”181 
Certain small-island states will be inundated by sea-level rises.
182
 Even 1°C warming 
threatens HRs through deteriorating crop yields, reduced fresh water supplies,
183
 more 
extreme weather events and increased climate-related disease
184
 – trends already experienced 
below 1°C.
185
 Furthermore, given climate “tipping points” and positive feedbacks186 causing 
“runaway” climate change,187 Hansen suggested (in 2008) that increasing emissions “for just 
another decade, practically eliminates” short-term possibilities for returning atmospheric 
compositions beneath tipping levels. Thus, retaining control over mitigation requires a rapid 
and deep transition, targeting atmospheric concentrations of 350 parts per million (ppm) or 
lower;
188
 concentrations passed 400ppm in May 2013.
189
 The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change’s (IPCC) estimates a 350-400ppm target requires emissions to peak no later 
than 2015, dropping at least 85 percent (compared with 2000 levels) by 2050.
190
 Hansen 
concludes preserving “a climate… to which humanity is accustomed” requires most 
remaining carbon reserves are “never emitted.”191  
In line with the precautionary principle, the only guarantee of avoiding “dangerous” 
interference that systematically undermines HRs is thus to limit emissions as much as 
possible. Nonetheless, policy benefits from setting long-term targets for large-scale emissions 
reductions and shorter-term targets providing continuity, like the UK Climate Change Act 
(which mandates periodic carbon budgets towards a long-term goal).
192
 Significantly, given 
emissions anywhere matter, states must not only cut domestic emissions but also emissions 
they contribute to elsewhere. HRs thus insist on stringent mitigation standards.  
Thresholds also address formal justice disputes by insisting on satisfying thresholds 
first in clashes between rights. In conflicts between the right to continued carbon-intensive 
development in industrialised nations and the right to self-determination in small-island states, 
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the right to development does not protect “relatively trivial” Western lifestyles over “non-
trivial” thresholds HRs threatened by extinguishing the right to self-determination,193 however 
large or small the groups in question are. Conversely, HRs’ indivisibility means the right to a 
safe environment “cannot be bought at the expense of” people’s right to an adequate 
livelihood;
194
 thus, mitigation programmes must also seek to satisfy, not limit, people’s 
threshold HRs.   
 
3.3.2.2 Disaggregation, non-discrimination and prioritisation 
HRBAs criticise previous development practices for failing to protect, or target measures 
towards, most vulnerable groups through the non-discrimination principle. HRs’ “lens of 
analysis”195 disaggregates development, focussing on inequality’s root causes. Vis-à-vis 
climate change, HRBAs can focus “more directly on… real-life effects on… individuals and 
communities,” directing efforts to the most vulnerable.196 This also helps determine priorities. 
HRs specify minimum core obligations (thresholds) that must be met before other 
improvements.
197
 This can justify prioritisation based on historical neglect. HRs also prioritise 
based on interdependencies between rights. The non-retrogression principle also insists rights 
must not slide backwards. Together, these mean development strategies must not conduct 
trade-offs, like allowing inequality to persist in return for growth, or sacrificing CPRs for 
economic gains.
198
 Prioritisation may only happen on practical, rather than intrinsic, grounds, 
and only in allocation of incremental resources.
199
 Furthermore, process rights ensure local 
priorities are central.
200
 HRs therefore acknowledge mutuality between ESCRs and CPRs,
201
 
expanding development beyond economics to encompass the totality of human experience.
202
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3.3.2.3 Participation and empowerment 
HRs can bolster increasing acknowledgement of procedural rights in environmental law, 
including the Aarhus Convention.
203
 While participation and empowerment have been 
invoked in development before, Gready and Ensor insist they are “reclaimed and 
repoliticized” from neo-liberalism under HRBAs.204 Enforceable rights make participation 
“non-negotiable” in development, rather than simply desirable,205 and provide a focal point 
for social movement mobilisation.
206
 This “mobilisation potential” is vital given mass 
participation’s decisive role historically in social change.207 Participation provides 
development with legitimacy
208
 and sustainability by encouraging rights-holders to take 
ownership.
209
 Decentralisation and democracy become instruments of development. 
Furthermore, ensuring meaningful participation means guaranteeing economic security, and 
empowering participants through education and key CPRs, like freedom of association.
210
   
 
3.3.2.4 Accountability  
HRBAs reframes development around duty-bearers’ accountability to rights-holders, rather 
than operating through promise-making. Accountability is simultaneously formal, informal, 
legal and political. Identifying rights and duty-holders is “not a neutral act;” it focuses on 
“deep-rooted inequalities” for which HRs “abuses are conceived as symptoms and structural 
causes of conflict.”211 Regarding climate change, HRBAs make duty-holders directly 
accountable for reducing people’s vulnerability. HRs become “tool[s] for monitoring and 
evaluating mitigation and adaptation… and their impacts.”212 OHCHR also suggests the use 
of HR-based indicators to monitor progress; while many will be standard socioeconomic 
indicators (including unemployment figures), what differentiates a HR indicator is “explicit 
derivation from” a HR and “the purpose to which it is put,” namely HRs monitoring to hold 
duty-bearers accountable.
213
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HRs also extend accountability to international actors. International assistance 
becomes obligatory (unlike in aid politics), drawing on ICESCR Article 2, while 
accountability mechanisms exist internationally, and states must respect HRs in international 
negotiations and agreements.
214
 As suggested previously, these systems have a poor record in 
accountability. However, HRs also offer normative and moral accountability, providing 
standards by which actions are judged and against which claims are made. Furthermore, for 
Caney, HRBAs not only reframes debates about costs to ensure they are not used as obstacles, 
but also considers “duties of compensation.” HRs-based compensation is not “permission to 
engage in… violations” assuming these can eventually be compensated;215 rather, remedies 
are owed to affected communities as a right.
216
  
 
3.3.2.5 Criticisms of HRBAs 
HRBAs face two main criticisms. On the one hand, some see them as too political, ignoring 
the implications of advocating a “paradigm shift” that challenges development actors to 
confront issues they traditionally avoid.
217
 At their worst, HRs can justify powerful states’ 
breaches of others’ sovereignty, constitute a form of aid conditionality, or, through stressing 
individual rights, be co-opted by neo-liberalism, promoting individualistic development.
218
 
Some suggest HRs give “false hope,” recasting people as “subject/victim” reliant of external 
elites.
219
 Specifying clear normative parameters for development also begs the question of 
what is left for participatory processes to discuss, or what happens if participants articulate 
priorities contradicting HRs.  
 Conversely, HRBAs have also been criticised for not being political enough. Ideas like 
empowerment can become naïve and apolitical, overlooking structural issues and entrenching 
inequality.
220
 Paradoxically, those who see HRs as not political enough also fear they can 
allow neo-liberalism to “reposition itself” in HRs terms.221 Critics question the value-added of 
using HRs, suggesting they simply restate development problems in HRs language without 
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practical guidance.
222
 Furthermore, by insisting rights are indivisible, HRBAs are said to offer 
little guidance for resource-constrained prioritisation.
223
 
 These mutually-exclusive critiques of HRBAs – labelled the 
“depoliticization/politicization nexus” by Gread and Ensor224 – testify to how HRBAs can be 
used as “an all-encompassing veneer… malleable to the needs” of whoever adopts them. This 
ambiguity is captured by development practitioners responding to Miller; while one 
complained there was “no Bible” for implementing a HRBA, another criticised HRBAs given 
they “don’t need a Bible.” HRBAs thus have much in common with JT – they can remain 
normative markers, suggesting an alternative development philosophy, without specifying 
content. Differences between minimalistic and broader JT approaches are paralleled in 
distinctions between “legalistic” (rights-based) and “empowerment” (human rights-based) 
approaches.
225
 Miller finds many organisations use “rights-framed,” rather than rights-based, 
approaches, incorporating HRs “only at… operational level,” thus taking advantage of the 
“ideological promiscuity of rights talk.”226 Similarly, Gready and Ensor suggest three levels 
of HRBAs. One simply restates development in HRs rhetoric; a second inserts HRs indicators 
into existing programmes; and a third seeks a “fundamental rethinking” of development.227 
Miller suggests HRs themselves are a “master frame,” repackaging the very idea of 
being human alongside ideas like dignity and justice. Furthermore, the convergence of 
development and HRs is itself a “frame change” from traditional approaches.228 The same 
applies to the convergence of climate change and HRs. Reframing environmental issues in 
human terms is crucial for JT, the HRs and climate change discourse, and EJ, which stresses 
“framing… environmental concerns as civil rights, social justice, and human rights issues.”229 
This recognises mainstream environmentalist frames – even the term ‘environment’ – suggest 
environmentalism “is an area of life separate from… the economy and jobs.”230 Therefore, it 
worth remembering JT and HRs are social constructions; they share a desire to develop 
frames for linking ecology and society, but require clarity about their normative parameters 
they assume to avoid them becoming solely problem-solving. 
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3.4 HRs and JT 
Thus, there is considerable overlap between JT and structural HRs approaches. The Cancun 
Agreements recognised both JT and HRs for the first time,
231
 with JT supporters welcoming 
HRs references given both are “important elements of a social and economic vision for a 
climate agreement.”232 Rights language is a regular feature of JT visions. However, a 
reconciliation of the two – a HRBA to JT (HRBAJT) – has not been undertaken.  
Broadly, HRs standards offer much-needed normative clarity to JT’s central tenets, 
ensuring JT transcends defensive parochialism by stressing broader social transformations; 
while JT focuses HRs on the immediacy of climate change and ecological crisis, and brings 
an equally-necessary focus on work’s centrality and social movement agency in achieving a 
transition.  
 
3.4.1 Analytical frameworks and JT 
Early JT statements often claimed an umbrella “right to a just transition”233 as an opportunity 
for a broader transformation of society, just as solidarity rights envisage fulfilling all HRs. A 
right to JT could be seen alongside the right to ecological space as equally necessary enabling 
rights; JT is ineffective without recognising ecological limits, while realigning society along 
these limits requires a JT. This cuts through ‘efficacy versus equity’ debates; HRBAJTs are 
only effective if they achieve sustainability, which itself encompasses equality; if they do not, 
they will perpetuate inequality. Thus, JT is only effective if it is just and only just if it is 
effective. Ecological limits thus set natural realism as the benchmark by which effectiveness 
is judged. 
Where JT stresses embracing transitions is ultimately in workers’ and communities’ 
self-interest, Pogge’s approach offers a clearer moral imperative for participants in unjust 
structures to work for their reorganisation. Crucially, the institutional approach emphasises 
HRs enjoyment can be insecure. This stresses to JT that workers’ rights are insecure where 
premised on non-renewable resources and self-defeating contributions to climate change. This 
gives a longer-term view of workers’ self-interest, avoiding a parochial JT that defends short-
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term interests of those in carbon-intensive industries when their long-term interests are at risk. 
This gives impetus to JT and militates against delays. Bell also stresses this is a duty of 
rectification owed to those affected by climate harms, necessitating a transition away from 
carbon-intensive production that has historically brought workers and communities significant 
benefits. Therefore, this effectively provides criteria for what is ‘just’ in JT, stressing 
Humphrey’s corrective and substantive justice. Mitigation is imperative for both HRs and JT; 
institutional approaches emphasises negative duties ending harm caused by one group to 
another, giving mitigation greater moral impetus, while JT promotes replacing carbon-
intensive industries, a positive duty for the transition. Bell’s general duty to allocate specific 
climate duties matches JT’s focus on planning the transition. Furthermore, where Bell stresses 
mitigation regardless of new climate agreements, JT also seeks a transition as quickly as 
possible without requiring international agreements first.  
 Ultimately, the institutional approach provides an analytical framework for 
reorganising society; JT focuses on who achieves this through working-class and community 
agency.    
 
3.4.2 HRBAs and JT  
3.4.2.1 Normative standards  
HRs’ substantive coherence gives JT much needed clarity. Rather than being simply 
desirable, HRs make JT an obligatory part of decarbonisation.   
HRBAs employ specific HRs standards. As JT stresses work’s importance, seeing 
work as a right is crucial for HRBAJTs. HRs recognise work’s contribution to “individual 
fulfilment… constitution of one’s identity, and social inclusion” as well as “survival” and 
other subsistence HRs.
234
 By stressing work’s importance to human dignity, HRs bolster JT’s 
insistence on its centrality in the transition.  
UDHR declared the right to work as encompassing free choice, just and favourable 
working conditions and remuneration, non-discrimination, collective organisation, protection 
from unemployment, and social protection.
235
 Its key articulations are ICESCR Articles 6 
(and accompanying General Comment 18), 7 and 9, and International Labor Organisation 
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(ILO) conventions.
236
 Under ICESCR, states must “take steps,” using “maximum… available 
resources,” towards “achieving progressively… full realization” of ESCRs;237 General 
Comments and ILO standards highlight what such full realisation entails. Given its Cold War 
origins, the right did not achieve consensus on whether it is a right “to a job;”238 ICESCR 
“recognize[s],” rather than guarantees, the right; however, clearer emphasis on protection 
against unemployment and a “right not to be prevented from working”239 makes work-related 
security a core aspect. Stephenson notes social protection, key to the ILO’s “decent work” 
agenda, encompasses work-related security given it “promotes human dignity and security in 
the workplace.” Stephenson concludes work-related security is “key” to the right to work. 
This links to Sen’s view of unemployment as a “capability deprivation.” Thus, links “can be 
drawn between decent work, or more specifically social protection and human security.” 
Stephenson also stresses how “job security” (linked to a particular job with particular skills) 
has evolved into “employment security,” which seeks to “guarantee employment… but not 
any particular job,” combining social protection with skills development opportunities to 
ensure security and enhance “prospects in the labour market.”240 
General Comment 18 specifies duties to respect the right involve not “denying equal 
access to decent work for all.” Stephenson suggests this obliges “a comprehensive approach 
to social and economic policies that… include[s] employment opportunity and security.” 
Protect duties mean states must safeguard against third-party violations. Fulfil duties from the 
General Comment require “a national policy on the right to work” for economic development 
that overcomes “unemployment and underemployment, in order to achieve full employment;” 
such policy does not guarantee everyone work but aims “at ensuring work for all who are 
available and seeking” it. In total, states “must take a comprehensive approach towards 
employment policy by taking into account all the necessary measures to ensure the right to 
work, including work-related security.”241 This “comprehensive approach” is often neglected 
in transition programmes.  
                                                 
 
236
 Sarkin and Koenig, 2011, pp24-25 
237
 ICESCR, Art.2 
238
 Sarkin and Koenig, 2011, pp5-6 
239
 Ibid, pp24-26 
240
 Stephenson, 2011, pp168-169 
241
 Stephenson, 2010, pp4-5 
 37 
Stephenson explicitly recognises obligations for a “just transition” within a “human 
rights approach” to climate policy.242 He stresses that, in formal legal analysis, states might 
argue they do not violate respect duties for the right in meeting climate obligations if climate 
obligations were “implemented… alongside a comprehensive employment policy” that aims 
to provide “work for all people available… and willing” given “an equal or greater number of 
jobs will be created in the new green economies;” protect and fulfil duties would be met if 
“policy is aimed at achieving full employment” and the state “takes all of the necessary 
measures to ensure the right to work.” However, Stephenson’s more critical, “progressive” 
legal approach recognises, like JT, that jobs created will be different from those lost, require 
new skills and therefore could lead to some becoming “unemployable in a… green economy.” 
This creation of insecurity “violates the right to work.” Thus, states must “facilitate a 
vulnerable workers’ transition between jobs by providing employment services.”243 
ILO standards specifically provide for guaranteeing employment security in 
transitions. ILO Recommendation No.122 Article 8(b) stresses “selective measures directly 
connected with the employment of individual workers or categories of workers” should be 
taken during transitions beyond existing legal requirements; Article 13(1) states measures 
“should be planned… to prevent the emergence and growth of unemployment or 
underemployment;” Article 13(3)(b) states initiatives must “protect from financial or other 
hardship groups and individuals… affected by structural changes;” and Recommendation 
No.169 Article 10(a) requires measures to “facilitate adjustment to structural change at the 
global, sectoral and enterprise levels” and “re-employment of workers who have lost their 
jobs as a result.” Therefore, in “green structural change,” ILO standards require 
“supplementary” and “specific work-related security measures.” Given few states “have taken 
into account the effects of climate change on employment,” potential violations are clearly 
possible.
244
  
Stephenson suggests reconciling climate and HRs obligations requires identifying 
affected jobs (lost and created) and skills, and initiating “participatory dialogue… for 
formulating a just transition” given the “in-depth understanding” of those in affected 
industries about climate measures’ implications. This helps achieve the transition and climate 
goals by anticipating “skills-gaps” impeding green industries. Long-term, integrating climate 
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agreements and employment policy, and institutionalising dialogue, are required. This also 
benefits the transition and climate goals by ensuring “political sustainability” of long-term 
emissions reductions.
245
 These ideas clearly fit planning and participatory JT aspects.  
The right to work’s therefore recognises that even formal comprehensive employment 
policies can overlook threats to work-related security in the transition; this matches JT’s 
reframing of the transition from protecting certain jobs to protecting certain workers. Thus, 
creating green jobs is insufficient without disaggregated strategies, including regarding skills. 
The right accordingly gives clear standards for planning JT. During transitions, the right 
requires supplementary measures for affected workers. Furthermore, new green jobs must be 
“decent.”246 This provides a normative and legal framework against which to judge JT’s 
workers’ protection and green jobs programmes, while JT proponents have developed 
templates for how these will operate. Furthermore, like JT, the right envisages a central role 
for states in meeting HRs commitments. Finally, the right to free choice of work includes 
rights not to work and to refuse work where it infringes human dignity.
247
 This gives a basis 
for Green Bans and other ecologically-motivated refusals to work.  
In terms of contradictions within JT on the state’s role, HRs cannot be neutral on this 
issue; doing so would be a problem-solving approach, implicitly accepting current neoliberal 
economic parameters that, as EJ theorists show, drive climate change and ecological 
degradation and restrict participatory influences on ecological decision-making. Market-based 
initiatives do not address structural impediments to JT. Even with deep intervention, markets 
will struggle to deliver a transition as rapidly as required. Climate Risk suggested there is “a 
window” between 2009 and 2014 for establishing “low-carbon industrial architecture.”248 
After 2014, we reach a “point of no return” where market-based mechanisms cannot meet 
mitigation requirements because “constraints on industrial growth will create a situation 
where industrial production cannot respond to price signals.”249 Achieving 80 percent 
emissions reductions by 2050 (from 1990 levels) requires green industries increase 24 percent 
annually after 2010 – 29 percent annually would be required if delayed until 2014. This is 
extremely difficult because industries only realistically have a maximum growth rate in 
markets of around 30 percent given access to labour, capital and other resources. Growth 
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beyond 30 percent has only previously been managed through a war-footing.
250
 War-footings 
are characterised by active states, a point emphasised by several JT advocates.
251
 States can 
take a more holistic perspective to industrial growth’s limitations, including skills, than 
numerous private actors reacting independently to potentially-ambiguous market signals. 
Furthermore, while setting low carbon prices insufficiently incentivises transitions, 
setting high prices without addressing distributional effects can have negative consequences. 
In emissions trading and market schemes, private interests often benefit without significant 
environmental gains, passing costs onto workers and communities. Designing policy around 
pollution taxes can also perversely incentivise continuing those practices to maintain revenue. 
Fundamentally, market incentives are poor substitutes for direct involvement through which 
states, as primary HRs duty-bearers, can reorganise societal structures for HRs enjoyment. 
 Beyond the right to work, HRBAs’ minimum thresholds share a non-utilitarian 
approach with JT. Thus, clear standard-setting is key to HRBAJTs as thresholds must not be 
breached in the transition. Thresholds also give JT a means for defining “dangerous” 
emissions levels; one of the most important standards to set is therefore emissions reductions. 
In terms of HRs recognising emissions across borders, JT also acknowledges this given it 
seeks transitions in carbon-intensive industries that are often export-orientated.  
 
3.4.2.2 Disaggregation, non-discrimination and prioritisation 
Refocusing attention from aggregated economic discussions to human impacts is central to 
both HRBAs and JT. However, HRs have implications for JT by stressing workers have 
individual rights related to the transition regardless of the disposition of collective 
organisations to which they belong, including unions. While HRs are necessarily exercised 
collectively, they insist on consent to that assembly. Thus, if a union refuses to embrace the 
transition (such as in protectionist alliances with employers), workers still have rights vis-à-
vis a transition and may organise on this basis. This reflects EJ critiques – that JT must 
empower workers, not unions as institutions.  
There is much overlap regarding prioritisation. Where HRBAs focus on historical 
neglect, so too have EJ proponents, arguing for using JT to expand rights to neglected groups. 
The notion of HRs’ interdependency tessellates with JTs focus on work as key to other 
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aspects of welfare. HRBAs and JT also share non-retrogression principles. Using participation 
to elicit priorities in HRBAs is similar to JT visions that stress workers and communities’ 
local, specific knowledge necessary for effective transitions. Finally, HRBAs’ expansion of 
development beyond economics is similar to the EJ tradition’s focus on broader 
transformations beyond workers’ economic interests. This avoids defensive JT programmes 
by stressing the importance of other HRs, including international linkages. Together, 
HRBAJTs must question “the economic development paradigm, rather than just seeking to 
make it lower carbon.” This avoids what Watts calls “low carbon industrialisation,” which is 
effectively “a subsidy to industry” overlooking structural concerns.252  
 
3.4.2.3 Participation and empowerment 
JT insists workers and communities are central in participatory transition planning. HRBAs 
ground this participation in non-negotiable rights. This covers workers whose representatives 
engage in social dialogue, but also those in industries that do not have a social dialogue 
tradition. JT is premised on workers and communities in carbon-intensive industries actively 
embracing the transition. HRs insist social dialogue becomes one means of a participatory 
transition, rather than an end in itself. Together, the different structural HRs approaches 
ensure JT, and any dialogue, is based on clear parameters defined by ecological limits, rather 
than self-defined, parochial conceptions of JT. Consequently, HRs enhance the efficacy and 
equity of JT by ensuring fundamental principles of the transition are non-negotiable. 
Both HRs and JT emphasise the integral, not just desirable, role of participation. 
HRBAs are influenced by Sen’s view that development is “thoroughly dependent on… free 
agency,” which is both a “constitutive part” of development and “contributes to 
strengthening… free agencies of other kinds.” Institutional arrangements are themselves 
influenced by people exercising freedom through participation in social choice and public 
decision-making.
253
 Thus, for Sen, freedoms are development’s “principal ends” and 
“principal means.”254 JT also stresses participation’s integral role regarding workers’ and 
communities’ support (given “fear of job losses could have a paralyzing impact on progress 
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toward … mitigation”),255 and also their local self-knowledge and expertise being necessary 
for the transition. The integral effectiveness of participation has empirical backing. Within the 
OECD, electorates “generally attach considerable importance to… distributional 
consequences of mitigation.”256 Evidence suggests participatory, community-based initiatives 
are effective at producing positive behavioural change. Successful initiatives depend on 
ownership and control, local relevance, achieving immediate successes that maintain long-
term participation, receiving appropriate responses from relevant authorities, and a trusted and 
sustained resource base. This helps overcome the “urgency-agency gap,” which is caused by 
several issues HRBAs and JT address, including inequality of impacts, consumption patterns, 
neo-liberal practices shifting balances of power between market, state and civil society, and 
presentation of climate change in technocratic terms that prioritise “technological and market-
based response above… social change.” Johnson et al suggest “a socially-‘grown’ response” 
in which “sense of ownership… is high… could more effectively create the conditions for a 
rapid transition.”257 Ultimately, without cooperative and equitable approaches, competitive 
exploitation of any resource, including global commons like a liveable climate, “may continue 
until it is depleted.”258 
Participative initiatives tend not to emerge without leadership from “informed and 
issue-led” organisations, suggesting a role for social movements and civil society groups.259 
HRs, as focal points for social movement mobilisation, provide a common language to labour 
and environmental groups with different traditions and starting points under JT – a positive 
visions, rather than “sacrifice”260 narratives of ending carbon-intensive societies. Advocates 
of HRBAs to climate change argue its value-added is both an analytical framework and basis 
for action, using legal and political frames to spur the transition.
261
 Ultimately, JT too is 
analytical frame and basis for action, stressing radical climate action is unsustainable without 
participation from affected workers and communities. Both HRs and JT seek the transition’s 
legitimacy and sustainability in local ownership and control, where emphases on 
decentralisation in HRBAs combine with emphases on economic democracy, localisation and 
prefigurative projects in JT. Furthermore, both traditions stress empowerment. JT focuses 
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empowerment at workers and communities; HRs highlight meaningful participation can only 
occur if basic HRs are met, giving a clearer definition for JT’s empowerment.  
 
3.4.2.4 Accountability  
Accountability is said to be particularly absent in the transition discourse. In critiquing 
preparatory measures for the Rio+20 Conference, the UN Independent Expert on Solidarity 
stated HR “normative references that should serve as a system of State accountability” were 
“sorely missing.”262 HRs, by clearly identifying duty-holders, give JT reference points with 
which to make demands. International channels offer an opportunity to appeal, morally and 
legally, beyond recalcitrant employers or states to claim rights.  
HRs’ internationalism also gives specificity to JT’s internationalist urges, ensuring 
local JTs are accountable for their impacts elsewhere. HRs recognise arguing against climate 
action given carbon leakage effectively postpones inevitable transitions; compensatory 
measures do not promote secure HRs enjoyment long-term, leaving affected industries 
vulnerable to later shocks. Rather than interpreting the international dimension as a zero-sum 
game pitting ‘developed’ against ‘developing,’ HRs give JT a way to reconcile both sets. 
First, thresholds of those (largely in ‘developing’ states) threatened by climate change 
outweigh the right of those in ‘developed’ countries to continue unsustainable carbon-
intensive development. Secondly, HRs of those in carbon-intensive industries are insecure 
because of climate change and resource depletion. Thus, postponing transitions over fears of 
carbon leakage does not secure sustainable HRs enjoyment in industrialised nations, or benefit 
workers and communities elsewhere. Furthermore, HRs provide an impetus for overcoming 
leakage altogether by recognising both carbon leakage and globalisation’s ‘race to the bottom’ 
involve use of lower standards by one or more states, creating a free-rider problem. HRBAJTs 
should therefore work for a “floor of social protection” internationally, giving ‘developing’ 
nations space “to improve conditions and stabilize their own social development.”263 
Fundamentally, carbon leakage discussions ignore how unilateral climate action might inspire 
change elsewhere, catalysing international agreement. HRBAJTs specifically seek to avoid 
industry relocation by supporting industrial transitions; in advocating social transformation, 
they send clear signals of ambition; they focus on mobilising public support through 
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participation and ensuring an equitable transition; and their internationalism promotes cross-
national alliances seeking similar transitions globally.  
  
3.5 Summary: A HRBAJT 
The following table summarises the role of HRs in a HRBAJT:
 44 
 
 ASPECT HRs CONTRIBUTION JT CONTRIBUTION HRBAJT 
A
n
a
ly
ti
ca
l 
fr
a
m
ew
o
rk
 
Solidarity rights Right to ecological space, 
recognising ecological debt 
Right to JT Right to a JT towards society 
based on equal ecological space 
Institutional approach 
How has the state contributed to 
carbon-intensive structures? 
Certain societies morally-obliged 
to reorganise coercive structures, 
e.g. carbon-intensive 
development 
Workers/communities in carbon-
intensive industries have long-
term interest in reorganisation 
Workers/communities in 
industrialised states dependent 
on carbon-intensive industries 
have moral/long-term interests in 
societal reorganisation  
Is HRs access secure? 
 
HRs can be insecure  Workers/communities insecure 
given climate change/resource 
depletion 
Workers’/communities’ HRs can 
be insecure 
How has the state or groups 
within it worked to reorganise 
these structures? 
 
Negative duties (mitigation) 
paramount 
Positive measures   Mitigation and positive plan 
General duty (promote efforts to 
allocate specific duties) 
Planning Planning and promoting 
allocation of specific duties 
Duty of rectification and not to 
benefit from delays 
Embracing need for transition Recognition of 
workers’/communities’ duty of 
rectification  
Mitigation before and after 
agreements 
Transition as soon as possible Responsibility for rapid 
transition 
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P
o
li
cy
 p
ri
n
ci
p
le
s 
HRBAs  
Normative standards – right to 
work 
 
HRs standards guide 
development 
Work’s centrality Work as a right 
Deprivation and capabilities Recognising work’s importance 
to human dignity 
Comprehensive approach to 
employment taking all necessary 
measures to ensure the right, 
including work-related security 
(given maximum available 
resources and progressive 
realisation) 
Protecting certain workers, not 
certain jobs 
Comprehensive green jobs 
approach and disaggregated 
measures, e.g. skills 
Supplementary transition 
measures aimed at specific 
workers  
Workers’ protection  Workers’ protection as a right 
Green and decent jobs Green jobs programmes and 
active state 
Green, decent jobs programme 
Right to free choice Refusing environmentally-
damaging work  
Right to refuse environmentally-
damaging work 
Thresholds Minimum thresholds overriding 
other values 
Similar non-consequentialism  Clear standard-setting shapes JT 
 46 
“Dangerous” anthropocentric 
interference causes widespread 
HRs deterioration 
Unclear what is “dangerous” Clear emissions standards for JT 
Emissions anywhere matter Transitions for export-orientated 
carbon-intensive industries 
Emissions anywhere matter 
Disaggregation and non-
discrimination  
Disaggregated approach 
Individuals have rights, even 
when exercised collectively 
Empowering workers, not unions 
as institutions 
Workers/communities have right 
to a JT – regardless of 
disposition of unions, employers 
or states 
Prioritisation Historical neglect Targeting neglected groups Targeting historically-neglected 
groups 
Interdependency 
 
Work central to welfare Right to work key to broader 
social transformations 
Non-retrogression 
Process rights/participation Workers’/communities’ specific 
knowledge vital  
Workers’/communities’ right to 
determine priorities 
ESCRs and CPRs Broader-than-economic societal 
transformation 
HRs extended and deepened in 
social transformation 
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Participation and empowerment Participation non-negotiable Workers/communities key 
stakeholders 
 
Workers/communities right to 
participate, regardless of social 
dialogue tradition 
Participation’s integral value 
Legitimacy and sustainability through ownership 
HRs as focal points for 
mobilisation 
Labour-environmental alliances HRs as common language for 
labour-environmental alliances 
Decentralisation and democracy Localisation, economic 
democracy and prefigurative 
projects 
Decentralisation, localisation 
and economic democracy  
Empowerment – meaningful 
participation through economic 
security and CPRs  
Empowerment of 
workers/communities 
Empowerment – clear HRs basis 
for workers’/communities’ 
participation 
Accountability Identifying rights/duty-bearers Key stakeholders’ involvement Assigning rights/duties to key 
stakeholders 
Legal, political, formal and 
informal accountability 
Largely political and informal 
accountability 
Legal and political 
accountability 
HRs indicators Lacks indicators HRs as measures for JT 
Duties of compensation – 
remedies as a right 
Transition on condition that 
interests are protected  
Workers/communities owed 
transition as a right 
International mechanisms  Commitment to internationalism  International mechanisms 
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International obligations International obligations 
Respecting rights elsewhere Respecting rights to JT 
elsewhere  
International floor of social 
protection 
International floor of social 
protection 
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Alone, HRs and JT are malleable concepts open to cooption, de-politicisation and abuse; 
they can be used rhetorically, shallowly or technocratically to obstruct, slow or even avoid 
the transition necessitated by science. However, critical HRs and JT approaches together 
provide a framework for analysis and basis for action for ensuring a transition that is both 
just and effective. 
Applying HRBAJTs depends on contextual factors, particularly social movements’ 
relative strength; many details will be decided through participatory processes. However, 
the above framework can outline central considerations for such processes in particularly 
contexts by setting the analytical framework and then applying policy principles to assess 
current action, and outline alternatives. This will be undertaken vis-à-vis Norway.  
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4 A HRBAJT IN NORWAY 
4.1 Analytical framework 
Pöyry describe Norway as a “yellow” economy given its oil and gas (generally referred to 
as ‘petroleum’) industry and “increasing ecological footprint.”264 Its ecological debt is 
effectively explored using the institutional approach. 
Norway has contributed to coercive structures of carbon-intensive development 
driving climate-related HRs harms in two ways. Firstly, in 2011, Norway was the world’s 
seventh largest net exporter of oil and second largest net exporter of gas.
265
 Most oil and 
gas is exported (just 1.6 percent of gas is sold to Norway).
266
 While oil production peaked 
around 2000, gas production has roughly doubled since.
267
 Secondly, Norway has 
domestically followed carbon-intensive development. In 2009, it had the 34
th
 highest per 
capita carbon emissions globally, one of Europe’s highest.268 Domestic emissions have 
increased around 30 percent since 1990 despite many consumer goods now being 
imported.
269
 WWF notes Norway’s “carbon footprint abroad” grew 33 percent from 2001 
to 2006;
270
 some studies suggest this has already surpassed domestic emissions.
271
 Future 
emissions reductions “may be outweighed by increased emissions abroad” given 
anticipated growth. Furthermore, imports are shifting towards higher-polluting states and 
products.
272
  
Key obstacles to the transition in Norway are, Pöyry suggest, petroleum path 
dependency, costs, market failure, sector divisions and interest group opposition (especially 
petroleum interests).
273
 In Pogge’s terms, the first four are coercive structures upheld by the 
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latter in interplay between domestic and international actors. Above all, petroleum is said to 
exert a pervasive “ideological influence” on society.274 This impacts HRs security. 
Petroleum contributes to HRs both directly, through jobs, and indirectly, through 
contributions to the economy. 65,293 are directly employed in petroleum (51,431 in 
petroleum industries, 13,862 in industries whose products or services “are mainly made use 
of as a production factor in” petroleum).275 Estimated direct and indirect jobs related to 
petroleum were 206,000 in 2009 (an estimate of “great uncertainty”),276 representing 8 
percent of total employment.
277
 Most of those directly employed live in south-western 
counties Rogaland (40.90 percent), Hordaland (21.53 percent), and Møre og Romsdal (4.60 
percent).
278
 The industry represents around a quarter of GDP and state revenues
279
 
(taxation, direct ownership and Statoil dividends):
280
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The state’s net cash flow from petroleum (after covering the structural non-petroleum 
deficit)
281
 goes into a sovereign wealth fund for investment overseas. Established in 1996, 
the so-called ‘oil fund’ (oljefondet) exceeds 4 trillion kroner (NOK) today, over NOK 
800,000 (US$137,850) per citizen.
282
 While relationships between wealth and HRs are 
contested, evenly-distributed wealth is one proxy for HRs, particularly ESCRs; Norway has 
topped the Human Development Index (HDI) since 1998,
283
 topping inequality-adjusted 
HDI in 2012.
284
 
Petroleum’s contribution to HRs enjoyment is insecure long-term. The Norwegian 
continental shelf is “a mature region;” most fields are already discovered.285 Official 2011 
figures suggest 44 percent of reserves have been sold and delivered.
286
 Without sizeable 
discoveries, Norway “will barely be self-supplying” in 2030.287 Furthermore, the industry 
has increasingly deleterious effects on wider society. While oljefondet and other factors 
(including highly-centralised wage-setting) ensure Norway is considered one of “few 
exceptions” to side-effects of resource wealth, like ‘Dutch Disease,’288 the industry 
increasingly monopolises “financial and human resources to the detriment of” other 
(including green) industries,
289
 while inflating wage and cost levels in the wider 
economy.
290
 Shrinking production could therefore make Norway “a future case of Dutch 
disease.”291 Petroleum-related employment has grown despite falling production, 
exacerbating dependency and making Norway “extremely vulnerable” to oil prices.292 
Meanwhile, extraction costs are expected to rise as climate regulation and technological 
developments incentivise renewables, making petroleum-related investments today 
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“risky.”293 HSBC warn “unburnable” reserves (given climate change) could strip 60 
percent of petroleum companies’ value, with Statoil particularly exposed.294 
The industry is also unsustainable as the single largest contributor to domestic 
emissions (28.7 percent)
295
 – despite being considered among the world’s “cleanest.”296 In 
2006, emissions were 8kg CO2-equivalent per barrel oil equivalent (o.e.) compared to 
global averages nearer 20kg
297
 given numerous efficiency measures, especially supplying 
fields with power from land (‘electrification’).298 However, energy-intensiveness is 
growing with maturing fields, decreasing reservoir pressure, and gas processing and 
transport being more energy-intensive than liquids.
299
 2010 figures already suggested 
production was no longer world-leading.
300
 
Overall, directly petroleum-dependent workers’ and communities’ HRs are 
insecure; but petroleum dependence makes general HRs enjoyment vulnerable. Norway is 
therefore a society in which workers and communities have moral and long-term interests 
in embracing JT. Regarding whether the state and other groups have worked to reorganise 
carbon-intensive structures in line with Bell’s duties, Norway has, through the UNFCCC, 
promoted allocation of more specific climate duties, and been particularly active in 
adaption financing, climate-related forestry and renewable projects in the South,
301
 which 
somewhat acknowledges duties of rectification. However, since becoming involved in 
international climate politics, Norway has actively increased petroleum production,
302
 
without constraining domestic emissions. Norway negotiated a 1 percent emissions rise for 
its first KP commitment period, which does not sit well duties for immediate mitigation. 
Therefore, Norway has not met vital duties of rectification implied by Bell’s general duty. 
These duties consequently become more imperative in future policy.  
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4.2 Policy analysis  
4.2.1 Normative standards 
The Norwegian government aims for “the world’s most ambitious climate policy.”303 
However, Pöyry conclude “despite great ambitions” and numerous initiatives, “there has 
been little focus on… completing political programmes” for “structural changes.” Current 
development thus suggests “increasing consumption and emissions.”304  
 
4.2.1.1 Right to work 
Norway does not recognise a transition as a right; the government supports a “long-term 
goal” of a global “right to emit,”305 but this has not had practical consequences. HRs are 
absent in climate policy. There is no comprehensive policy for fulfilling the right to work 
alongside climate obligations, meaning Norway risks violating the right under formal 
analysis (let alone Stephenson’s work-related security analysis). There are no targeted 
workers’ protection schemes for petroleum’s inevitable decline, and no unified programme 
for green, decent jobs to replace it. This is the first contradiction of Norwegian climate 
policy – pushing for tougher global climate action that further accelerates petroleum’s 
decline without offering a positive scheme in its place, thus making Norwegian HRs 
insecure. 
The Soria Moria declaration (2009), the current government’s second term 
programme, states “green jobs within energy production and environmental technology will 
be a new growth industry.”306 Far from recognising green jobs’ centrality to the right to 
work in a transition, this does not imply a transition at all, but increasing green jobs 
alongside carbon-intensive development. This is the second contradiction of Norwegian 
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climate policy – lack of integration of industrial, energy and environmental policy means 
climate initiatives are undermined by concurrent carbon-intensive development. The 
petroleum industry is exempted in climate policy beyond its domestic emissions. Instead, 
climate policy is “dominated” by purchasing emission quotas overseas, rainforest 
conservation, and carbon capture and storage (CCS), beyond which “the impression is… 
everything can continue as before.”307 A baffling array of climate initiatives gives the 
appearance of action, but structural issues are rarely considered.  
This is illustrated in contradictory climate and energy policies. A 2012 climate 
white paper (klimamelding) trailed several measures, formalised by cross-party agreement 
(klimaforlik).
308
 However, these measures (some of which are explored below) are nullified 
by concurrent petroleum plans. A 2011 petroleum white paper (petroleumsmelding) charted 
a “long-term production plan”309 and reserve growth of 800 million standard cubic meters 
(sm³) o.e. by 2015 alone.
310
 According to Framtiden i våre hender (Fivh), burning 
remaining reserves would release emissions 331 times current annual domestic 
emissions,
311
 and much of this is already planned. A 2013 Finance Department 
perspektivsmelding (“Long-Term Perspectives” white paper) acknowledged petroleum 
revenue would decline, but envisioned continued production and export,
312
 while 
addressing climate vis-à-vis petroleum only regarding higher prices affecting 
profitability.
313
 A chapter on the environment and climate focused on international 
negotiations, carbon pricing and emissions scenarios without addressing petroleum.
314
 
Climate issues were therefore downgraded from previous perspektivmeldinger, implying, 
for Bellona, “the government does not believe… klimaforlik can be implemented.”315 
Meanwhile, the industry has co-opted environmental concerns to support continued 
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production, with KonKraft (a petroleum interests’ alliance of government, unions and 
industry) suggesting gas exports will reduce emissions through replacing European coal 
use,
316
 while the sector’s efficiency expertise should itself be exported.317 
2012’s energy committee (energiutvalget) report was expected to initiate an 
energimelding addressing energy and climate policy,
318
 but the government has not written 
one given existing energy-related meldinger.
319
 For Bellona, despite talk of Norway 
becoming Europe’s “green battery” through exporting renewables, this means no 
coordinated strategy exists.
320
 Energiutvalget lacked coordination with klimameldingen and 
its mandate excluded broader climate-related implications;
321
 thus, a minority proposed 
using gas domestically without CCS, directly contradicting climate policy.
322
  
Norway thus has several renewable-related targets (including elsertifikater, 
discussed later, and the EU’s renewable energy directive)323 but no roadmap for achieving 
them, leaving its renewable energy potential unfulfilled. For example, Norwegian solar 
companies have “world class” capabilities;324 however, global overcapacity means firms 
risk being bought and moved out of Norway (as has happened already) by companies from 
states with long-termer solar strategies.
325
 While hydropower already accounts for 96 
percent of electricity production,
326
 there are no strategic plans for using estimated 
technical potential by 2020 of 30 terawatt hours (TWh),
327
 15TWh through upgrading 
existing projects, or 5TWh from micro-hydropower.
328
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A national offshore renewables strategy was launched in 2009; evaluations of 
developments were due in 2012,
329
 but it is unclear what became of this. Estimated onshore 
wind physical potential (excluding difficult terrain and protected areas) is 1,874TWh 
annually.
330
 Offshore potential is 13,970TWh, 19 percent of which resides south of 61 
degrees latitude (encompassing counties where most petroleum workers live). “Significant” 
amounts are already technologically-feasible.
331
 “World-class” research and technical 
competencies, developed through petroleum, exist for offshore wind.
332
 Developing 30,000 
megawatts (MW) of the potential 120,000MW identified in 2007 would create an estimated 
50-60,000 offshore jobs (initially located in currently petroleum-dependent areas) by 2030 
using Greenpeace’s methodology.333 Nonetheless, deficient strategic planning aggravates 
technological limitations, especially lacking grid capacity for increased electricity 
production. Estimated technical potential for onshore wind by 2025 is therefore only 17.4-
21.5TWh.
334
 Lacking capacity regionally means national agencies de-prioritise license 
applications from regions despite large physical potential, while developers prepare “less 
ambitious plans.”335 Even so, while only 3.2TWh can be developed in North Norway by 
2025, applications number 20TWh.
336
 Capacity problems are exacerbated by unpredictable 
subsidy schemes and slow application procedures.
337
 Many planned developments will not 
be ready until 2025 under existing conditions.
338
  
Offshore, completely new grid connections are required.
339
 While connections for 
electrification of petroleum fields could be used, comprehensive electrification remains 
uncertain and is likeliest first where water depths are unfavourable to offshore wind.
340
 
Expanding ocean-based energy or integrating with European markets through cross-
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national cables will have “significant” costs341 and environmental impacts on biodiversity 
and local concerns (which, in the north, could implicate indigenous Samis’ HRs). Protected 
areas, local demands to keep production away from coastlines, and conflicts with fishing 
and shipping exacerbate technological limitations. Many coastal waters are too deep given 
commercially-available technology; while developing turbine foundations for depths of 
100m continues, most offshore wind today stops at 20.
342
 Longer distances from shore 
reduce conflicts and biodiversity impacts, but require technologically-immature floating 
arrays.
343
 Clear strategies for addressing these problems are missing.  
Furthermore, while klimameldingen heightened efficiency requirements for new 
build,
344
 the government’s promise to deliver clear efficiency targets for existing buildings 
resulted in a vague pledge of a “long-term goal” for new developments to “be sustainable 
with a low footprint,” which Bellona considered a “violation” of klimaforliket.345 
Government estimates of 15TWh savings by 2020 would require 3.5 times current non-
residential renovation rates, while no schemes exist for residential buildings.
346
 Norway has 
59.9TWh estimated technical savings potentials in residential and non-residential buildings, 
and industry, by 2020.
347
 
The Global Subsidies Initiative estimated Norwegian petroleum subsidies at NOK 
25bn in 2009, including tax exemption for exploration;
348
 however, overall government 
spending is considerably higher. The 2013 budget included NOK 28.32bn for state direct 
petroleum concerns (SDFIs) alone.
349
 Zero highlight over NOK 1.3 trillion is invested in 
petroleum through (largely state-owned) Statoil, with NOK 241bn of oljefondet invested in 
petroleum companies overseas.
350
 This dwarfs climate-related spending (even including 
CCS-funding) – the new climate, renewable energy and energy reorganisation fund 
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received NOK 10bn in 2013,
351
 while climate and forest-related development funding, and 
renewables projects in ‘developing’ nations, received NOK 5bn.352 The government does 
have significant renewables interests through the largely state-owned enterprise Statkraft, 
Europe’s largest renewable energy producer (mainly given hydropower); Norway increased 
Statkraft shares to NOK 14bn in 2010, helping Statkraft’s NOK 82bn investment 
programme domestically and abroad.
353
 Another state enterprise, Enova, promotes climate-
related energy transitions; it supports full-scale demonstration projects (increased by NOK 
30m in klimameldingen)
354
 spending NOK 9bn delivering 16.6TWh in renewables or 
energy efficiency between 2002 and 2011.
355
 Other past funding includes a NOK 500m 
environmental technology programme from 2011 to 2013. In publicly-funded research 
(R&D), klimameldingen claimed renewable R&D was “level” with petroleum356 (tacitly 
admitting a two-track policy), but this claim is difficult to verify.  
Fundamentally, the continued and historical strategic role of the state in building 
petroleum activities starkly contrast the laissez-faire, market-orientated approach of climate 
policy. Indeed, policy is effectively premised on maintaining carbon-intensive activities to 
fund compensatory activities – Norwegian climate policy’s third contradiction. 
  
4.2.1.2 Thresholds 
Without a HRs framework and clear standard-setting, a short-term, cost-benefit approach 
dominates policy. Focusing on carbon pricing and market mechanisms overlooks structural 
issues and HRs thresholds. This is Norwegian climate policy’s fourth contradiction – given 
inadequate spending on structural issues, and duplicated spending on carbon-intensive and 
carbon-reducing activities, its short-term, cost-benefit approach is costlier long-term.  
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The government describes setting a global carbon price as the “most important” 
climate initiative.
357
 Since 1991, petroleum activities have paid carbon taxes.
358
 Pre-
existing taxes were often reduced to avoid increasing overall tax burdens, with “many 
exemptions” allowed.359 Klimameldingen raised taxes to NOK 200 per tonne CO2.360 
Norway introduced emissions trading in 2005. The second period (2008-2012) included 
petroleum, coinciding with the KP’s first period and Norway’s entrance into the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS). Land-based industry and energy producers received free 
allocations corresponding to 87-100 percent of average annual emissions from 1998 to 
2001, while the petroleum industry did not.
361
  
Norwegian climate policy’s central tenet is that “in areas… subject to general 
measures, like the emissions trading system, further regulation will, as a general rule, be 
avoided.”362 ETS reliance limits more ambitious approaches, and is fundamentally failing. 
For The Economist, ETS has “long been a mess.” Its future is unclear after failure to agree 
measures to arrest falling prices in 2013.
363
 A report from 40 international organisations 
finds emissions reductions in the second period were caused by the economic crisis; ETS 
has not spurred significant investment; it has failed its own objectives; and enriched private 
interests at public expense, while encouraging fraud.
364
 
 Regarding target-setting, since 2007,
365
 Norway targets 30 percent emissions 
reductions on 1990 levels by 2020, increasing to 40 percent “if it can contribute to… an 
ambitious climate agreement” where “major” emitters accept “concrete” obligations; 
“carbon neutrality” by 2030 (ensuring “emissions reductions corresponding to Norwegian 
emissions in 2030,” thus anticipating reductions overseas)366 if multilateral agreement is 
reached where “other industrialised states” accept “significant” reductions;” and “carbon 
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neutrality” by 2050 regardless of multilateral agreements. Norway lacks requirements for 
successive carbon budgeting in the UK Climate Change Act, meaning action on longer-
term targets could be delayed. More fundamentally, allocations between domestic and 
overseas reductions are incompatible with HRBAJTs. It is often reported that two-thirds of 
the 2020 reductions are intended domestically. However, this ‘two-thirds’ commitment 
(cutting 15-17Mt CO2) was calculated using a business-as-usual scenario (59Mt) in 2020, 
not 1990 levels (50Mt) as the goal itself. Cutting 15-17Mt from 59Mt gives 42-44Mt (12-
16 percent cuts on 1990 levels), meaning the rest of the 30 percent cut can occur 
elsewhere.
367
 This is incompatible with the KP’s flexibility mechanisms, which must only 
be “supplemental” to domestic reductions.368 Even these domestic targets are too high for 
the Finance Department.
369
 Financing overseas reductions has effectively been used to 
“purchase… the right to continue… emissions” domestically,370 abnegating ecological debt 
and duties of compensation. Making emission targets contingent on international 
agreements also ignores existing HRs responsibilities.  
Ultimately, targeting reductions overseas works from the (correct) observation that 
global, not national, emissions matter. However, Norway only considers global emissions 
when avoiding domestic cuts; its unwillingness even to discuss petroleum exports’ global 
contribution is climate policy’s fifth contradiction.  
 
4.2.2 Disaggregation, non-discrimination and prioritisation 
No central evaluation of climate-related employment threats or opportunities has been 
undertaken. The Klimakur report outlined measures to meet 2020 climate targets, but 
excluded petroleum extraction
371
 and employment-related consequences, emphasising 
                                                 
 
367
 Naturvernforbundet, 2013 
368
 KP, Art.6(1)(d)  
369
 Todal, 2012  
370
 Davidsen et al, 2012  
371
 Fivh, 2011, p8 
 61 
aggregated, cost-benefit approaches.
372
 Failure to confront the transition’s costs means they 
are often passed to consumers and workers, blunting positive visions of the transition. 
One example of insufficient disaggregated analysis is the elsertifikat initiative with 
Sweden, aiming for 26.4TWh of new renewable production across the countries by 2020.
373
 
In Norway, this requires a 10 percent increase in electricity production.
374
 Elsertifikater 
involve energy producers receiving ‘certificates’ for producing renewables, thereafter 
selling them on a market as extra income. Certain suppliers must buy certificates, ensuring 
demand. Certificate costs are paid through increasing energy prices.
375
 The scheme has 
been criticised for including hydropower projects feasible without subsidies. Hydropower 
will likely receive more support than wind. Pricing is not differentiated between renewable 
energy forms. Furthermore, consumers must pay but industry has certain exemptions,
376
 
suggesting private producers will benefit at consumers expense. Sector actors doubt it will 
meet targets, while producing an energy surplus without planning how to use it.
377
  
 Given aggregated policy approaches, prioritisation towards marginal groups is 
discounted. Workers and communities have limited avenues for influencing priorities 
through exercising participatory rights; most initiatives are top-down. Regarding non-
retrogression, assumptions climate initiatives will protect or enhance HRs are particularly 
dubious given lacking analysis of policies’ social effects and unwillingness to confront 
petroleum’s decline. A new industry climate fund (klimafond) has been established (to 
reach NOK 50bn by 2016) to assist industrial transitions through technological 
development, renewables and energy restructuring,
378
 which could contribute to protecting 
HRs of those involved in such industries long-term. Measures will be financed through 
investment returns and funds released by elsertifikater, which will go into Enova’s energy 
fund (energifondet) and support “full-scale production lines.”379 Klimafond – a long-term 
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demand from various organisations – was the best received klimamelding proposal.380 
However, Zero stress its effectiveness depends on its structure and concrete goals.
381
 While 
klimafond could contribute to greening industries and jobs, more detail is required to avoid 
simply subsidising ‘low-carbon industrialisation.’  
 This is problematic regarding CCS. Prime Minister Stoltenberg described the 
government-sponsored Test Centre Mongstad as Norway’s “moon landing.”382 
Nonetheless, projects “have been plagued by… postponements,” with future results 
“uncertain.”383 Klimamelding predicted the decision-making basis for realising Mongstad 
would not reach parliament until 2016.
384
 The 2013 budget gave NOK 3.4bn to CCS.
385
 
Klimamelding also insisted all new gasworks use CCS, effectively guaranteeing electricity 
production comes from renewables until CCS “has found a satisfactory solution.”386 
 As Fivh highlight, CCS will play an “at best limited” role after 2020. CCS operates 
at large emissions sources, but much global fossil fuel use occurs in transport, homes and 
businesses. In 2011, CCS projects representing 25Mt CO2 were cancelled globally, while 
new plans representing 24Mt were launched. World wind production that year represented 
300Mt reductions if replacing fossil fuels.
387
 Beyond incurring high costs for modest 
mitigation, CCS entrenches carbon-intensive path dependency without developing 
alternatives, perpetuating deleterious HRs effects globally while ignoring effects of 
petroleum’s decline on Norwegian HRs.  
 
4.2.3 Participation and empowerment 
Worker and community participation is not central to climate policy. For government and 
unions like LO, social dialogue is promoted without clear parameters, becoming an end in 
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itself. Established petroleum interests effectively control many policy areas. Participation 
beyond established lobbying channels is minimal; consultation with civil society groups is 
formalistic and centralised, largely through parliamentary høring processes. Participation’s 
integral value is underutilised.  
Tripartite dialogue on climate change became part of national union-employer 
agreements in 2009;
388
 however, pinpointing concrete outcomes is difficult. Some unions 
have argued workplace representatives and committees should be expanded to cover the 
“exterior environment” (including climate change), but this was rejected by a 2010 
parliamentary committee.
389
 
Many Norwegian unions explicitly support JT. Three confederations – Unio 
(covering university and colleges), Akademikerne (the Federation of Norwegian 
Professional Associations) and YS (the Confederation of Vocational Unions) – have 
demanded a climate law, green taxation, and “green innovation” strategies towards a JT.390 
YS has committed to protect “built-up union rights” and ensure these are transferred to new 
jobs arising from green investment and skills strategies.
391
 Contrastingly, while LO (the 
Norwegian Confederation of Trade Unions, Norway’s largest workers’ confederation) has 
backed several workplace environmental initiatives,
392
 and promoted JT internationally,
393
 
it has opposed meaningful domestic cuts, encouraged (in alliance with employers) a 
restrictive view of carbon leakage,
394
 and supported greater oil
395
 and gas production.
396
 A 
European study suggests this reflects LO’s difficulties in balancing petroleum industry 
members’ interests with environmental concerns.397 Other unions publicly lament LO’s 
“deficient climate effort.”398  
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LO are often criticised by environmentalists,
399
 and left outside labour-
environmentalist cooperation, including joint petitioning for klimaforliket.
400
 Such joint 
campaigning is relatively rare, perhaps given LO’s intransigence, although cooperation is 
growing in certain areas (including workplace ‘greening’).401 Many environmental groups’ 
priorities, like climate policy generally, remain technical, overlooking social effects. For 
example, Fivh’s petroleum de-escalation plan does not analyse distributive consequences or 
“socioeconomic costs” because they support reduced consumption, therefore opposing 
increasing GDP or disposable income.
402
 However, simply cutting aggregated consumption 
is far likelier to impact lowest earning (and consuming) groups. Fundamentally, disbanding 
petroleum without proposing alternative green jobs does not provide a positive vision of the 
transition or radical climate initiatives.  
Broader social movement mobilisation could be sparked by oil prospecting near the 
sensitive Lofoten and Vesterålen areas. Such prospecting became official Labour Party 
(and LO) policy in 2013, meeting unprecedented internal opposition.
403
 Externally, this has 
seen oil prospecting “become one of” Norway’s “largest conflict issues.”404 This has yet to 
expand to oppose oil prospecting generally, although petroleum dependency is increasingly 
questioned.
405
  
Beyond social movements, broader economic democracy is absent from the 
Norwegian discourse. Decentralisation occurs given local initiatives are often the purview 
of local municipalities, but major climate initiatives remain centralised. The biggest 
obstacles to empowerment remain scarce avenues for participation; climate concern among 
Norwegians is high.
406
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4.2.4 Accountability 
Lacking legislation making climate targets an “absolute requirement” in decision-
making,
407
 responsibility for target-related duties is unclear, making it difficult to hold 
successive governments legally or politically-accountable for distant targets. Governmental 
departments that “do not have climate targets as their primary mandate” often reject 
sustainable choices if these contradict “sector targets.”408 HRs are not employed for 
measuring the transition, while seeing the transition as workers’ and communities’ right is 
overlooked.  
Regarding respecting HRs overseas, Norway maintains a high-profile in climate 
negotiations, pushing for binding agreements at the recent Doha conference.
409
 
Development policy promotes climate initiatives, including the state development 
investment tool NORFUND (strengthened under klimamelding to increase commercial 
renewable investments), while klimamelding considered increasing climate-related forestry 
funding in the South above the NOK 3bn given annually if other countries increased 
contributions.
410
 There have, however, been difficulties using these funds,
411
 while 
oljefondet has undermined this by investing in logging companies,
412
 not to mention 
Statoil’s foreign tar sands investments.413 Ultimately, Norway’s position in international 
negotiations is increasingly undermined by continued petroleum commitments.  
Elsewhere, climate initiatives are often treated as a zero-sum game. A self-defeating 
conception of carbon leakage dominates, defending short-term interests rather than 
confronting long-term threats. There is little debate about raising standards abroad to avoid 
leakage. Regardless, leakage is not relevant to petroleum; leaving one state’s fossil fuel 
resources alone ensures a share of global carbon reserves remains untouched.  
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4.3 HRBAJT in Norway 
Whether Norway requires its own version of Britain’s climate law has been much debated. 
Pöyry stress such regulation is “independent of economic analysis” and “set with… 
prioritised societal aims in mind.”414 It could therefore set a HRBAJT’s normative 
standards. As well as formalising targets and consecutive carbon budgets,
415
 the British law 
established a Committee on Climate Change (CCC), giving scientific advice and 
challenging policies contradicting the Act;
416
 and limited flexibility mechanisms use, 
meaning most cuts must occur domestically.
417
 It offers a politico-legal reference for social 
movement challenges, including defeating airport expansion.
418
 However, the Act 
overlooks HRs; carbon budgeting does not mandate evaluating social impacts.  
 Instead, a HRBAJT might demand a JT law (rettferdig omstillingslov) guaranteeing 
the right to a JT within equal ecological space, outlining the analytical framework and 
policy principles. A CCC-equivalent could provide scientific advice on fulfilling the right 
to JT – tackling climate change while fulfilling all HRs – within Norway’s allocated 
ecological space. The law could set a 2050 target of at least 85 percent domestic emissions 
reductions from 1990 levels
419
 through successive carbon budgets. Norway’s climate debt 
requires further mitigation elsewhere, but supplementary to this target.  
Enshrining such a right has implications.  
 
4.3.1 Transition from petroleum 
Continued petroleum activities are incompatible with ecological limits. Transitioning from 
petroleum is the “most important individual [climate] measure Norway can take.”420  
Fivh suggest a transition through stopping exploration and new developments in 
existing fields by redeeming extraction permits where developments are yet to begin 
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(returning Statoil to full state ownership and waiving its permits would assist this); closing 
existing fields by buying-out private interests; and limiting production to long-term gas 
contracts.
421
 With efficiency measures, this would reduce domestic emissions from 
petroleum by 75 percent by 2020.
422
 Gas production would remain over 80bn sm³ o.e. in 
2020 (compared to 100bn today)
423
 given around 80 percent is tied to 10-20 year contracts. 
Fivh suggest more abrupt stoppages could see importers switch to coal; thus, gas 
production would not cease until 2030. Oil is not so contractually-constrained.
424
 Any 
future oil extraction should be for product production, not energy.
425
 
State enterprise Petero and Statoil (70 percent state-owned) control around 70 
percent of the continental shelf. Given share prices in March 2012, Fivh estimate costs of 
buying-up Statoil at NOK 147bn, with other companies’ property on the shelf valuing 
NOK 300-400bn. One way of buying-out these could be exchanging holdings on the 
continental shelf with Statoil’s international holdings. Thus, a maximum NOK 400-500bn 
(one tenth of oljefondet) would be needed; indeed, many contracts will end regardless 
before 2020 (and many more before 2030).
426
 Furthermore, as sole owner, the state would 
receive all gas-related income
427
 (NOK 1.7 trillion by 2020 even after production 
decreases).
428
 This plan would mean around 16 percent of potential emissions from burning 
remaining reserves would still be released – over 50 times current domestic emissions. 
Going further might require breaking contracts, provoking retaliation measures.
429
 Fivh 
suggests the government assists importers to replace gas with Norwegian renewables;
430
 
oljefondet could also invest in renewables in those countries. Reducing oil exports will also 
reduce emissions elsewhere by increasing oil prices. Using Statistics Norway (SSB) 
estimates, Fivh’s scenario could produce up to 42Mt CO2 reductions elsewhere by 2020 – 
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dwarfing proposed domestic mitigation – and so long Norwegian gas is not entirely 
replaced by coal, “very positive” reductions are likely.431 Regardless, studies suggest if gas 
replaced all coal consumption globally, warming would only be 20 percent less than 
continued coal use. Increasing Norwegian gas production to avoid European coal reliance 
exacerbates path dependency and is “mistaken” economically given EU renewable 
targets.
432
 
Anticipating this transition’s employment effects is crucial. Workers require 
targeted protection programmes, with early notice and, where necessary, retraining, income 
support while finding new jobs, and relocation assistance. Based on the Canadian Centre 
for Policy Alternatives (CCPA) framework,
433
 a maximum cost scenario can be calculated 
that:  
 
 Assumes every worker participates – unlikely given many have transferable skills, 
including for green jobs. Indeed, SSB figures on extraction industry employees 
show 10.66 percent are leaders or managers, 25.66 percent are professionals, and 
21.31 percent are technicians or associate professionals.
434
 Pöyry quote Sintef 
estimates that 100,000 offshore petroleum jobs can be directly transferred to 
offshore wind.
435
 Sintef’s research is unavailable publicly; given fewer than 
100,000 work in petroleum, this number perhaps includes onshore and indirect jobs. 
Furthermore, certain workers might retire rather than participate; 
 Uses average annual wage and benefits for extraction industries (NOK 742,800), 
obscuring disparities between managers (earning on average NOK 1,160,400 
annually) and craft workers (earning on average NOK 514,800 annually);
436
  
 Assumes average programme participation of 1.87 years, given CCPA’s 
assumptions workers with post-secondary education require 0.75 years participation 
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(6 months to 1 year dependent on age), while those with secondary education 
require 2.5 years (2-3 years based on age). As educational profiles are not provided 
by age, exact ratios cannot be used. Given employees’ educational profile (41,756 
with secondary education or non-declaring, 23,537 with post-secondary education), 
average participation is 1.87 years (41,756 x 2.5 = 104390; 23,537 x 0.75 = 
17,652.5; 104390 + 17,652.5 = 122,042.75 / 65,293 = 1.87); 
 Assumes workers find equally well-paid work after participation, thus not requiring 
additional income support. This should be green job programmes’ goal; 
 Assumes every worker receives full relocation assistance. CCPA include relocation 
assistance of C$15,000 without explaining this figure. Today, C$15,000 
corresponds to NOK 86,000. I have rounded this up to NOK 100,000 in lieu of 
another methodology. Ultimately, the likelihood of workers relocating is low if 
accompanied by a green jobs programme. As seen earlier, there is significant 
potential for renewable energy in petroleum-dependent regions. These regions also 
have higher property values than elsewhere in Norway – the petroleum hub 
Stavanger (in Rogaland) has the highest, followed by Agder and Rogaland 
(excluding Stavanger), with West Norway (excluding Bergen) fifth highest;
437
  
 Assumes annual retraining costs based on average education costs per student in 
public universities (NOK 190,000 annually);
438
 and  
 Assumes 10 percent administration costs, covering targeted guidance.  
 
Total costs would be: 
 
Average annual income (742,800) + retraining costs (190,000) = 932,800 + 
administration (10%) = 1,026,080 x 1.87 years = 1,918,769.6 + relocation 
assistance (100,000) = 2,018,769.6 per worker x 65,293 workers = 
131,811,523,492.8 (131.81bn) 
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By comparison, net government petroleum cash flows are expected to reach NOK 
373.19bn in 2013.
439
 It is likely costs would be much lower given aforementioned caveats. 
It is also worth noting this replaces existing welfare entitlements; therefore, it is not an 
additional expenditure. In practice, such programmes will offer more generous support to 
some workers based on identifying needs, including in other industries. Fundamentally, 
HRBAJTs aim to avoid such programmes in future through creating sustainable green jobs 
and anticipating skills-gaps in advance. 
 
4.3.2 Green jobs programmes 
Petroleum’s industrial development is instructive for green industries. Norway’s petroleum 
industry is described as “the classic example” of building-up specialist knowledge440 as 
required for green technologies.  
After discovering petroleum in the 1970s, parliament agreed the petroleum “ten 
commandments,” establishing “national management and control” to create a domestic 
industry.
441
 To maximise technological and wealth-creating spill-over effects, licenses for 
foreign developers stipulated establishing onshore activities and using domestic suppliers. 
78 percent special corporation taxes recovered costs,
442
 while direct state involvement, 
through Statoil and later SDFIs, grew through preferential contracting.
443
 Innovation 
“would have been impossible without active state policy.”444 Universities directed research 
to technological challenges; the Research Council increased its role from the 1990s. 
Innovations halved costs and opened inaccessible areas. “Co-evolution” between industry, 
government and research institutions became systematic; entering the 2000s, the Labour 
Party, LO and regional interests promoted R&D programmes through mobilising political 
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networks. Furthermore, “symbiotic” relationships exist between companies and suppliers 
through regional clusters, characterised by specialist labour markets, inter-firm 
collaboration and increasingly-direct research institution links.
445
 
This has ensured Norway has, relative to other petroleum-rich nations, managed 
petroleum to promote national welfare. Similar approaches could apply to green industries. 
One state-owned enterprise could, like Statoil for petroleum, drive industry development. 
Statoil could do this again, especially if returned to state control, which would also 
facilitate workers’ transitions. Crucially, green industries will not start entirely from 
scratch. Pöyry estimated “classic” green industries represented 4 percent of GNP in 2008, 
employing 89,000 (mostly in sustainable transport).
446
 Cluster approaches have already 
sparked green innovations.
447
 The solar industry is “a global player” thanks to knowledge 
from the process industry for new petroleum fields and “the same national R&D institutes” 
that helped develop aluminium.
448
 Environmental R&D programmes already exist, which 
could be consolidated and targeted towards green industry and job creation.  
Petroleum developed as it did because state, capital and labour pulled in the same 
direction; the crucial process is entangling these social relations and pointing them in a new 
one. As stressed before, rapid, critical HRBAJTs cannot adopt problem-solving neutrality 
on states’ role. Duties of rectification and ecological debt insist Norway use part of the 
wealth it has accrued through not respecting others’ HRs to redress these wrongs. Indeed, 
oljefondet – a near-literal manifestation of ecological debt – was designed to ensure future 
generations share in petroleum wealth. There is no better way to do this, or repay 
ecological debt, than by using oljefondet to reorganise society, ensuring sustainable HRs 
enjoyment.  
 
                                                 
 
445
 Sæther et al, 2011, pp377-379 
446
 Pöyry, 2012, p23 
447
 Ibid, pp42-43 
448
 Sæther et al, 2011, pp379-380 
 72 
4.3.2.1 Exporting renewables 
There is much debate in Norway about exporting renewable energy. Given existing 
domestic renewables production, for many, renewables only present an opportunity if 
combined with building international cables.
449
 This might appear, prima facie, to tackle 
climate change while providing green jobs. Nevertheless, there are two deeper issues. 
Firstly, generating amounts worth exporting requires large renewable projects and 
infrastructure across land and sea – threatening other users, aesthetics and ecology on 
which HRs themselves depend, especially biodiversity. Furthermore, as EJ highlights, 
social injustices often accompany environmental injustices; developments can 
disproportionately impact already-marginalised communities. Norway would have limited 
influence over export-related infrastructure abroad. Addressing this involves value 
judgements. By framing conflicts in human terms, HRBAJTs give a clearer picture of 
clashing values than cost-benefit approaches (which ignore non-market values) or 
approaches automatically prioritising local concerns. Principally, HRBAJTs insist on 
planning development on a broader basis than project-by-project, ensuring a holistic 
determination of consequences and different forms that developments can take; indeed, 
costs often cannot “be defended within the framework of individual development[s].”450 
Local planning through participation can explore how to maximise local benefits (including 
job creation) of potential developments, shifting debates from whether particular projects 
should be built to how areas can be developed to enhance HRs. This will not eliminate 
project-specific conflicts, but HRBAJTs also provide guidance here. Given HRBAJT is 
based on ecological space, this replaces cost-benefit analyses that judge ecosystems by 
short-term economic value. Instead, HRBAJTs recognise HRs depend on globally-
interconnected ecosystems (thus, wider effects of local projects must be considered); 
furthermore, certain ecosystems and landscapes are protected by cultural and indigenous 
rights. These must be balanced against HRs improvement engendered by tackling climate 
change. Prioritisation principles also apply, particularly thresholds (minimum core 
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obligations). One group’s thresholds cannot be sacrificed for another’s, no matter the 
contribution made; thresholds give clearer guidance for distinguishing ‘trivial’ from ‘non-
trivial’ HRs enjoyment.  
 The second export-related dilemma recognises exported energy precludes local 
production abroad, meaning Norwegian green jobs prevent green jobs elsewhere. Local, 
democratically-controlled energy production can be crucial for long-term, secure HRs 
access, avoiding energy dependence; decentralisation also reduces transmission wastage 
and infrastructural intrusions. Localisation envisages people meeting their own HRs 
wherever possible, prioritising provision for need, conforming with equal ecological space, 
and stressing cooperation over competition. Seeing JT as an opportunity to gain new 
competitive advantages implies this comes at others’ disadvantage. Norway has already 
exploited its natural wealth (a geographical accident) at others’ expense; repeating this in 
tackling climate change is incompatible with HRBAJTs.  
 Norway can create green jobs without exporting renewables. 50,000 sustainable 
transport jobs (through public transport, shifting goods transport from road to rail, and 
replacing fossil fuels with renewables) could be created over the next 20 years.
451
 Energy 
efficiency is highly labour-intensive, while assisting energy security
452
 and freeing capacity 
for energy-intensive industries. Government figures show energy efficiency worth 16TWh 
by 2020 would save NOK 100bn and avert controversial power-line projects.
453
 
Renewables should first be directed to domestic energy-intensive industry (with such 
industry relocating nearer to renewable sources)
454
 or be used in other energy carriers. 
10TWh of wind energy can produce solar cells worth 300TWh (Norway’s annual energy 
use).
455
 Regardless, Norway’s potential comparative advantage could disappear in “a few 
years” as other states transition quickly.456 Exporting renewables should, generally, assist 
others’ transitions, prioritising countries incapable of self-sufficiency. Hydropower can also 
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be used to balance fluctuating supply in countries generating wind.
457
 As Fivh suggest, 
Norway should not be credited for overseas emissions reductions from renewables 
export;
458
 given ecological debt, the 85 percent target must occur domestically.  
 Ultimately, exporting renewables goes to the heart of meeting HRs within 
ecological space, rejecting growth for growth’s sake.  
  
4.3.2.2 Overseas emissions  
This links to addressing overseas emissions from consumption. WWF has suggested 
putting an amount equal to Norway’s overseas carbon footprint into a fund for climate 
development initiatives.
459
 This amount could be ring-fenced within oljefondet. This meets 
historical responsibilities through ensuring technological and financial transfers better than 
border tax adjustments, which could affect HRs in Southern export-dependent industries 
without necessarily encouraging climate initiatives. However, this is ultimately a problem-
solving ‘solution.’  
From more critical perspectives, reconsideration of a world-system based on trading 
goods that can be produced locally is required. Fundamental consumption changes are 
necessary to reduce ecological footprints. However, rather than simply reducing 
consumers’ purchasing power (as Fivh propose),460 HRBAJTs should seek positive 
alternatives to mass consumption. Again, localisation is key, stressing production for need 
based on local priorities of long-lasting goods with full life-cycle considerations.  
 
4.3.3 Social movements 
The above outlines what could happen; more important is how it happens. HRBAJTs 
require social mobilisation.  
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 Social movement alliances are gradually developing in Norway. However, it is 
naïve to suggest are beyond preparatory mobilisation. Nor is the wider context propitious. 
In September 2013’s general election, the current government – responsible for existing 
deficient policy – is likely to be replaced by a coalition including the climate-sceptical 
Norwegian Progressive Party.
461
 Perhaps, in opposition, current governing parties will 
adopt more radical policies; with the Labour Party outside government, labour leaders 
might be more critical of government, including regarding ecology. This could exploit 
growing divisions within capital and the state – industry and political leaders increasingly 
question petroleum dependency.
462
 Nonetheless, given required urgency and scale, a 
HRBAJT appears distant.  
 Social movement progression often involves small, successive gains, rather than 
full-scale agenda implementation – in Gramscian terms, more a “war of position” (a “more 
cultural and informational modality of social transformation”) than “war of manoeuvre.”463 
Participants will have different focuses, working separately towards common goals; initial 
successes occur where mobilisation is advanced. The challenge is ensuring different actors 
maintain common goals without being sidetracked into narrower campaigns. First steps 
could see JT proponents unite formally and prioritise mobilising those affected by JT, 
namely petroleum-dependent workers and communities. This is already happening through 
‘Climate Election 2013’ – featuring several unions, environmental organisations and the 
Norwegian church – intending to make climate change an electoral priority, which has 
launched the ‘100,000 climate jobs and green workplaces now!’ campaign.464 However, 
social movements must also consider directly building transitions through localised 
initiatives that improve HRs security while addressing consumption patterns. This is 
increasingly seen globally, from energy cooperatives
465
 to local food distribution. Such 
“prefigurative politics”466 provide direct participatory experience of sustainable lifestyles, 
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cultivate counter-hegemonic constituencies of support and demonstrate the often-abstract 
vision of a low-carbon future.  
 
 77 
5 CONCLUSION 
HRs are conspicuously absent from the transition discourse. The HRs and climate change 
discourse has yet to address counter-hegemonic strands of this discourse, especially JT. JT 
is a contested normative marker open to problem-solving and critical interpretations. 
Likewise, a problem-solving, legalistic HRs approach restricts HRs’ role in climate and 
transition discourses, insufficiently addressing climate change’s scope and severity. More 
critical, structural HRs approaches can play a significant role in broadening critical JT 
strands. Solidarity rights and cosmopolitanist theories reinterpret HRs vis-à-vis changing 
transnational social forces and institutions, and ecological limits. HRBAs reframe 
economic development and climate policy in HRs terms, stressing HRs thresholds, 
disaggregation, participation and accountability. Ultimately, these emphasise that existing 
HRs demand climate action regardless of other climate agreements. Thus, HRs’ role in JT 
is to define more clearly what is ‘just’ in JT, offering clearer normative standards in a 
broader, internationalist approach that overcomes JT’s proneness to vagueness, 
parochialism and proceduralism; however, where HRs overlook agency, work’s centrality, 
and wider economic structures, JT’s critical traditions highlight workers, communities and 
social movements. Together, HRBAJTs provide a critical analytical framework and basis 
for action for rapid, effective and just transitions. 
 This framework reveals Norway’s contribution to climate-related HRs harms 
elsewhere, its ecological debt, and how insecure Norway’s HRs – dependent on non-
renewable resources – are. Climate policy’s main contradictions become clear. Firstly, by 
pushing for stricter climate agreements globally but not confronting petroleum dependency, 
Norwegian HRs become more insecure. Secondly, Norway is not transitioning to a low-
carbon society at all; climate initiatives are negated by continued carbon-intensive 
development. Thirdly, these initiatives are effectively seen as depending on continued 
petroleum revenues. Fourthly, a short-term, market-orientated, cost-benefit approach 
ignores structural issues, becoming costlier long-term. Fifthly, recognition that global 
emissions matter is used to avoid domestic cuts, but ignores global effects of petroleum 
exports, Statoil and oljefondet. Embracing a right to a HRBAJT uses HRs as benchmarks 
 78 
for societal transformation within ecological limits. This necessitates winding down 
petroleum while prioritising green jobs. This must confront particular Norwegian dilemmas 
regarding fundamental economic tenets that sit uncomfortably with the natural realism of 
equal ecological space. Social movements are currently unprepared for JT, but potential 
moments for further mobilisation exist, especially through prefigurative projects. 
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations passed 400ppm for the first time in human history 
days before this thesis’s completion. The question is not whether a new direction is needed, 
but what direction. Combining HRs’ normative authority with social movements’ muscle 
could reenergise climate politics. As Hansen suggests, if social movements put Norway 
“onto a clean energy path, the world would notice.”467 Current propitious circumstances for 
reorganising Norwegian society relatively painlessly will not last indefinitely. Delays mean 
costlier, dramatic transitions. HRBAJTs seek a more positive vision before time elapses. 
Green jobs provide “a bridge between the immediate needs the majority have” and “the 
need that every living thing… has to bring down emissions.”468 Ultimately, the “choice is 
not jobs or environment, it is neither or both.”469  
As Hansen warns, “there can be no Norwegian exception” to natural realism; 
renewables “must replace fossil fuels.”470 It is up to Norwegians whether they do this on 
their own terms.  
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